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Abstract
EFSA received a mandate from the European Commission to assess the effectiveness of some of the
control measures against diseases included in the Category A list according to Regulation (EU) 2016/
429 on transmissible animal diseases (‘Animal Health Law’). This opinion belongs to a series of
opinions where these control measures will be assessed, with this opinion covering the assessment of
control measures for African Swine Fever (ASF). In this opinion, EFSA and the AHAW Panel of experts
reviewed the effectiveness of: (i) clinical and laboratory sampling procedures, (ii) monitoring period
and (iii) the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zone, and the minimum length of time
the measures should be applied in these zones. The general methodology used for this series of
opinions has been published elsewhere; nonetheless, specific details of the model used for the
assessment of the laboratory sampling procedures for ASF are presented here. Here, also, the
transmission kernels used for the assessment of the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance
zones are shown. Several scenarios for which these control measures had to be assessed were
designed and agreed prior to the start of the assessment. In summary, several sampling procedures as
described in the diagnostic manual for ASF were considered ineffective and a suggestion to exclude, or
to substitute with more effective procedures was made. The monitoring period was assessed as non-
effective for several scenarios and a longer monitoring period was suggested to ensure detection of
potentially infected herds. It was demonstrated that the surveillance zone comprises 95% of the
infections from an affected establishment, and therefore is considered effective. Recommendations
provided for each of the scenarios assessed aim to support the European Commission in the drafting
of further pieces of legislation, as well as for plausible ad hoc requests in relation to ASF.
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Summary
This opinion is part of a series of opinions, in which the three-first Terms of Reference (ToR) of a
mandate received from the European Commission (EC) have been considered. The background and
specific details of this mandate can be found in the opinion. The ToRs in this mandate request an
assessment of the effectiveness of:
• the clinical and laboratory examination in their capacity to detect disease (or estimate the
disease prevalence within an establishment), either in suspect or confirmed animals in a single
establishment, or in establishments within restricted zones (ToR 1);
• the effectiveness of the duration of the monitoring period (for different scenarios) in the control
of suspected and confirmed outbreaks (ToR 2);
• the size and duration of the restriction zones, in their capacity for mitigating disease spread (ToR
3).
In order to harmonise the approach to these assessments, the methodology used in this series of
opinions, covering all Category A diseases, was agreed on, and published in a separate technical report
(EFSA, 2020a).
A qualitative assessment of the existing clinical examination procedures for African swine fever virus
(ASF) was carried out. For assessing the effectiveness of the laboratory examination, the within-herd
dynamics of African swine fever virus (ASFV) were modelled for five different scenarios (simulating
spread with current, as well as historic, ASFV strains of different properties as regards e.g. virulence),
using a stochastic SEIR epidemic model. More specifically, the number of dead pigs and prevalence of
infectious and seropositive pigs, respectively, at different time points post-introduction of the virus to
the herd as predicted by the model were used for the assessment. Further, scripts were written that
allowed the calculation of the median time (days) to reach a 10% seroprevalence and infection
prevalence, respectively, in a herd, as well as time to detection of a potential ASF outbreak in a herd
given a surveillance scheme based on weekly sampling of at least two dead post weaning pigs for
virus detection. The assessment confirmed the effectiveness for early detection in the event of a
suspicion (within 13 days post-infection) of the collection of samples from at least five pigs (dead or
with clinical signs if a sufficient number of dead pigs is not found) for detection of virus. In contrast, a
random sample aiming at 10% seroprevalence would lead to a delayed detection in all scenarios and
was assessed as not effective. Further, reducing the seroprevalence to be detected was not considered
effective either for early detection. For surveillance purposes aiming at early detection in the absence
of a suspicion, a weekly sampling of at least two dead post weaning pigs or pigs older than 2 months
in each epidemiological unit was assessed as effective, and would lead to virus detection at median
times of between 10 and 14 days post-infection assuming a 3% baseline mortality.
To answer ToR 2, and to assess the minimum length of time measures should be implemented in
the protection and surveillance zones (ToR 3.2), an extensive literature search (ELS) was carried out.
This ELS aimed to assess the average, shortest and longest period between the earliest point of
infection of a pig herd with an ASFV virus, and the time of reporting of a suspicion by the competent
authority. The average time to the reporting of a suspicion report was used then to assess the
effectiveness of the length of the monitoring period. For some of the scenarios, the existing length of
the monitoring period for ASF (15 days) was considered sufficient. However, for other scenarios, the
length of the monitoring period is considered effective only for outbreaks occurring in small farms.
Because of the initial low mortality, the detection of an outbreak in large herds could be delayed. In
those cases, extending the length of the monitoring period to 23 days is recommended. To assess the
effectiveness of the minimum length of time, the measures should be applied in the protection and
surveillance zones, the average and the longest time assessed via the ELS were used, respectively.
Based on this, the minimum duration of the protection zone (15 days) and the surveillance zone
(30 days), according to existing legislation) was considered effective.
To assess the effectiveness of the minimum radius to be implemented in the protection and
surveillance zones (ToR 3.1), transmission kernels were used. However, in the absence of kernels
estimated for ASF, available kernels for Classical swine fever (CSF) were used. These kernels were built
using data from previous outbreaks and represent the relative risk of transmission to each individual
establishment from the affected establishment. Assuming the transmission occurs from an affected
establishment, the probability of ASF transmission beyond the protection zone and surveillance zone
was 2 and 0.2%, respectively. The minimum radius was thus considered highly effective if/when
focusing on the control of the spread of the disease among and between domestic pig herds. It is
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important to note, however, that the transmission kernels presented cover only some of the risk
pathways associated with spread from the index case and that these probabilities do not take into
account the risk of transmission due to wild boar, or movements of live animals and products off the
establishment prior to confirmation.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Background and Terms of Reference as provided by the requestor
Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases (‘Animal Health Law’), hereinafter
referred to as AHL, requires the Commission to lay down detailed rules on the disease control
measures against listed diseases as referred to in point (a), (b) and (c) of its Article 9 (category A, B
and C diseases). The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts supplementing the rules laid
down in Part III of Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases (Animal Health Law) on
disease control measures for listed diseases as referred to in point (a), (b) and (c) of its Article 9
(category A, B and C diseases). Therefore, the Commission has developed and adopted a Delegated
Regulation laying down rules for the prevention and control of certain diseases (‘the Delegated
Regulation’). The rules laid down in the Delegated Regulation are in respect of terrestrial animals
largely replicating the rules currently in force concerning the disease control measures in the event of
animal diseases with serious effects on the livestock as they have proven to be effective in preventing
the spread of those diseases within the Union. Consequently, many animal disease control measures
laid down in existing Directives will be, to the extent that not already done by the Animal Health Law,
replaced by the rules provided in the Delegated Regulation. At the same time, these rules have been
aligned with the international standards from the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE),
wherever these existed. However, certain disease control measures proposed in the Delegated
Regulation, in particular in its Annexes, were considered as outdated i.e. possibly not based on most
recent scientific evidence at the time of development. Their review is considered as necessary.
Moreover, for those category A diseases for which rules were not established before or were not
detailed enough, certain disease control and risk mitigating measures are, due to the lack of scientific
basis, extrapolated from other diseases, for which rules existed in the past. Finally, for some other
diseases the evidence and scientific knowledge, was not available to the Commission and to the
Member States at the time of developing the Delegated Regulation due to the time constraints. The
following diseases are examples of the later: infection with Rift Valley fever (RVF), infection with
Mycoplasma mycoides subsp. Mycoides SC (Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia) (CBPP), Contagious
caprine pleuropneumonia (CCPP), Sheep pox and goat pox, infection with peste des petits ruminants
virus (PPR), African horse sickness (AHS), Glanders. In this regard, the existing rules will cease to
apply as from the date of application of the Animal Health Law and its complementing legislation
including the Delegated Regulation, i.e. from 21 April 2021. Certain of the proposed measures for the
prevention and control of category A diseases of terrestrial animals should therefore be assessed in
order to ensure that they are effective and updated based on the latest scientific knowledge in this
new set of legislation. This is particularly important in the case of those diseases that are less common
or have been never reported in the Union.
1.1.1. ToR 1: Sampling of animals and establishments for the detection of
category A diseases in terrestrial animals
Based on available scientific information, assess the effectiveness of existing sampling procedures
to detect or rule out the presence of each category A disease of terrestrial animals and, in case of
absence of effective procedures, develop them, in order to complete the rules provided for in Annex I
to the Delegated Regulation. In particular, provide for disease-specific procedures for the sampling of:
ToR1.1 Animals for clinical examinations to ensure the detection of the relevant category A disease
during the performance of official investigations in establishments that are affected or suspected to be
affected by category A diseases and visits in establishments located in restricted zones in accordance
with Articles 6(2), 13(3)(c), 14(1) and 26(2) of the Delegated Regulation.
ToR 1.2 Animals for laboratory examinations to ensure the detection of the relevant category A
disease during the performance of official investigations in establishments that are affected or
suspected to be affected by category A diseases and visits in establishments located in restricted zones
in accordance with Articles 6(2), 12(3), 13(3)(c), 14(1), 26(2) of the Delegated Regulation.
ToR 1.3 Establishments to ensure the detection of the relevant category A disease for the
performance of visits in establishments located in protection zones larger than 3 km and
establishments located in the surveillance zone in accordance with Articles 26(5) and 41 of the
Delegated Regulation.
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ToR 1.4 Animals for clinical and laboratory examinations to ensure the detection of the relevant
category A disease for the movement of animals from restricted zones in accordance with Articles 28
(5), 43(5), 56(1)(c) of the Delegated Regulation.
ToR 1.5 Animals for laboratory examinations to ensure the detection of the relevant category A
disease before and after being introduced in the affected establishments for repopulation, in
accordance with Article 59(2), (3) and (9) of the Delegated Regulation.
1.1.2. ToR 2: Monitoring period
1.1.2.1 ToR 2.1 Assess the effectiveness of the length of the monitoring periods set out in Annex II
of the Delegated Regulation for each category A disease of terrestrial animals. In this regard, it is
important to take into consideration that the monitoring period was introduced as a management tool,
which represents a time frame of reference assigned to each category A disease for the competent
authority to apply certain control measures and to carry out investigations in the event of suspicion
and confirmation of category A diseases in terrestrial animals.
This assessment should be carried out with respect to the following situations:
a) the records analysis carried out by the competent authority in the framework of the
epidemiological enquiry referred to in Article 57 of Regulation (EU) 2016/429, in the event of
suspicion of a category A disease (Article 8(4) of the Delegated Regulation);
b) the derogation from killing in the event of an outbreak of a category A disease in
establishments keeping animals of listed species in two or more epidemiological units (Article
13(1) of the Delegated Regulation);
c) the tracing carried out by the competent authority to identify establishments and other
locations epidemiologically linked to an establishment affected by a category A disease (Article
17(2) of the Delegated Regulation);
d) the exemption applied to certain products from the prohibitions laid down in Annex VI taking
into account the date they were produced (Article 27(3)(c) of the Delegated Regulation);
e) the specific conditions for authorising movements of semen from approved germinal product
establishments in the protection and surveillance zones (Article 32(c) and 48(c) of the
Delegated Regulation);
f) the repopulation of establishments affected by a category A disease (Article 57(1)(b) and 59
(4)(b) of the Delegated Regulation).
1.1.2.2 ToR 2.2 Propose the length of what should be the monitoring period in those diseases for
which the time is assessed as not effective.
1.1.3. ToR 3: Minimum radius of restricted zones and duration of the disease
control measures in restricted zones
ToR 3.1 Assess the effectiveness to control the spread of the disease of the minimum radius of the
protection and surveillance zones set out in Annex V of the Delegated Regulation for each category A
disease of terrestrial animals.
ToR 3.2 Assess the effectiveness to control the spread of the disease of the minimum periods
during which the competent authority should apply the restriction measures in the protection and
surveillance zones as set out in Annex X and XI for each category A disease of terrestrial animals.
1.1.4. ToR 4: Prohibitions in restricted zones and risk-mitigating treatments for
products of animal origin and other materials
ToR 4.1 Assess the effectiveness to control the spread of disease of prohibitions set out in Annex VI
of the Delegated Regulation with respect to the risk associated for each category A disease, to the
listed activities and commodities.
ToR 4.2 Review the available scientific information on risk-mitigating treatments that are effective to
control the presence of category A disease agents in products of animal origin and other relevant
materials. Based on this:
a) provide an opinion on the effectiveness of the risk-mitigating treatments for products of
animal origin and other materials produced or processed in the restricted zone set out in
Annex VII and VIII, and
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b) if relevant, suggest new treatments or procedures that can be effective to mitigate or to
eliminate such risk.
1.2. Interpretation of the Terms of Reference
To address the ToRs of the mandate, EFSA proposed and agreed with the European Commission
the following:
a) The publication of fourteen individual opinions, one per each of the diseases included in the
list of category A diseases for terrestrial animals, with each of these opinions providing the
answer to ToRs 1, 2 and 3. The current document is one of the 14 opinions covering ToRs 1,
2 and 3 for African Swine Fever (ASF).
b) The publication of a unique opinion covering ToR 4 for all diseases listed (i.e. ToR 4 is not
covered in this opinion).
c) To address ToR 1 (effectiveness of sampling procedures), EFSA agreed with the EC on 21
scenarios (based on different articles of the Delegated Act) for which the effectiveness of the
sampling procedures will be assessed (Annex C). Although these scenarios will be assessed
independently, some of these scenarios may be merged if the assessment processes are the
same.
d) To address ToR 2 (effectiveness of the monitoring period), 7 scenarios previously agreed with
the contractor were defined (Annex D). The assessment of the effectiveness of the monitoring
period will be done by assessing its ability to ensure that specific actions can be carried out
without posing a risk of disease spread, if the monitoring period is calculated backwards or
forwards from a specific date. If the length of the monitoring period estimated by EFSA is
longer than the existing monitoring periods, the existing monitoring period will be considered
non effective. If the length of the monitoring period estimated by EFSA is shorter than the
existing monitoring period, this existing monitoring period will be considered effective from a
disease control point of view. No assessment of the plausible unnecessary economic burden
that may be placed on the stakeholders as a result of an excessive length of the monitoring
periods will be done by EFSA.
e) The assessment of the minimum duration and the length of the radius of the protection and
surveillance zones (ToR 3) will be done independently. The setting of these two zones
(protection and surveillance zones) surrounding an affected establishment and the control
measures implemented in each one of the zones are based on the general principle that the
probability of disease spread is larger the closer the establishment is to an affected
establishment. The validity of this statement will not be assessed in this manuscript;
nonetheless the limitations that this assumption may have in the control of certain diseases
will, when relevant, be discussed.
f) The following scenarios in ToR 1 (Annex C) were not relevant for ASF, and therefore were not
included in the assessment:
i) scenario 4 because there are no non-listed species for which ASFV sampling is
recommended,
ii) scenario 7 because the minimum radius of the protection zone for ASF is 3 km,
iii) scenarios 10, 11, 16 and 17 because they refer to poultry, and
iv) scenario 14 as it refers to ungulates.
g) The duration of the monitoring period for ASF as described in Annex II of the Delegated
Regulation is 15 days.
h) The minimum length of the radius of the protection zone (PZ) and surveillance zone (SZ) for
ASF as described in Annex V of the Delegated regulation are 3 and 10 km, respectively.
i) The minimum duration of the measures in the PZ and SZ for ASF as described in Annex X and
XI of the Delegated Regulation are 15 and 30 days respectively.
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2. Epidemiology and geographical distribution of African swine fever
2.1. Epidemiology
African swine fever (ASF) is a severe contagious haemorrhagic disease affecting all breeds of
domestic swine and Eurasian wild boar. The agent is the ASF virus (ASFV), a double-stranded DNA
virus and sole member of the Asfarviridae family, genus Asfivirus (Galindo and Alonso, 2017).
ASF was first reported in the early 1900s from eastern and southern Africa (Mulumba-Mfumu et al.,
2019). Historically, the virus was introduced into Europe on two occasions, in 1957 and 1960,
respectively, both times to the Iberian Peninsula (Costard et al., 2009). The second introduction led to
the establishment of the disease on the Iberian Peninsula for three decades, with further spread within
Europe and to South America and the Caribbean. Successful eradication in Europe was achieved in the
1990s (with the exception of Sardinia where it has remained endemic) until a third spill over event
from the African continent to Europe occurred in 2007. This time ASFV was introduced to Georgia from
where it spread through the Caucasus and the Russian Federation, reaching Poland and the Baltic
states in 2014, and from there spreading further towards west and south. Since 2018, ASF has also
spread widely in China and large parts of Asia (Dixon et al., 2020).
African wild suids, in particular warthogs, are the natural hosts of ASFV and can become infected
via a biological vector – soft ticks of the Ornithodoros genus (Acari; Argasidae).1 This creates an
ongoing sylvatic cycle that can spill over into domestic swine environments in Africa. In African wild
suids, infection with ASFV results in asymptomatic infection (Jori and Bastos, 2009; Jori et al., 2013).
However, in domestic swine and wild boar, infection can cause acute haemorrhagic fever with case
fatality rates up to 100% in na€ıve populations infected with virulent strains (Blome et al., 2020).
Transmission of ASFV occurs through direct contact with infected animals (wild or domestic swine),
ingestion of contaminated materials (e.g. swill feeding) or through indirect contact with fomites
(bedding, vehicles, equipment, clothes, footwear, etc.) or soft ticks bites (Guinat et al., 2016).
ASF is a notifiable disease due to its serious economic impact to the pork and farming industry. As
there is no vaccine nor treatment available, early detection is key, as well as responding quickly to
outbreaks. A key component of early detection is passive surveillance, which relies on farmers,
veterinarians, hunters and other professionals from the pig and wildlife industries to report suspicions
of ASF in swine or wild boar immediately to veterinary authorities (Dixon et al., 2020).
Clinical signs and outcomes of ASF vary depending on species susceptibility, infectious dose and
strain virulence. The incubation period is between 3 and 14 days. In acute forms, the clinical signs are
high fever (> 40°C), watery and bloody diarrhoea, vomiting, haemorrhaging with bluish–purple spots
on the body, ocular and nasal discharge, bloody froth from the mouth, nervous signs and abortion in
pregnant sows. Death occurs 4–7 days after symptom onset in both domestic swine and wild boar
(Gallardo et al., 2018), while in peracute forms, sudden death with few signs can occur. Case fatality
rates in these two forms can reach up to 100%. In subacute forms, signs are less pronounced
(depression, anorexia, weight loss), the disease course is longer (up to 30 days) and the mortality
lower (30–70%) (Cruciere, 2003). The ASFV strains of genotype II currently circulating in Eastern and
Central Europe as well as in Asia are highly virulent, and typically cause an acute to peracute form of
the disease (Pikalo et al., 2019), although a limited number of genotype II viruses of lower virulence
have also been isolated from ASF-infected wild boar (Gallardo et al., 2018; Zani et al., 2018).
A chronic form of the disease typically associated with unspecific and rather mild clinical signs, may
also occur. Such chronic infections have been generally associated with infection with attenuated
genotype I strains that historically circulated in the Iberian Peninsula (Pikalo et al., 2019). Pigs with
chronic infections will eventually succumb to the disease. To what extent pigs that survive an infection
may remain infectious over time and be able to transmit the infection and thus play a role, as so-called
carriers, in the epidemiology of the disease is debated.
There are a wide number of validated diagnostic techniques available, including virus detection
tests, antigen detection and polymerase chain reaction (PCR) techniques. Antibody tests are also
available in the form of ELISAs, lateral flow devices and confirmatory tests, used for surveillance. For
early detection of the virus, the reference technique is PCR on blood or organ (spleen, lymph nodes,
tonsil, kidney) samples.
1 EFSA Story maps: African Swine Fever https://efsa.maps.arcgis.com/apps/MapJournal/index.html?appid=db62d
00222644945862b40fe6277831a
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2.2. Geographical distribution of African swine fever
African swine fever entered EU in 2014 and since then, ASFV has been spreading through Eastern
Europe and slowly expanding mainly in a south-westerly direction (EFSA, 2020b). In the years 2015–2020,
cases of ASF have been reported in 13 MSs – Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Sardinia (Italy), Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia – and many other countries in
Europe, Asia and Africa (Figure 1).
3. Data and methodologies
3.1. Methodology used in ToR 1
Although the general methodology applied to all opinions covering the assessment of control
measures for the Category A diseases produced under this mandate has been published elsewhere
(EFSA, 2020a), specific details of the methodology related to the ASF opinion are presented below.
Mathematical model and transmission scenarios considered
For the purpose of ToR 1 (i.e. to assess the effectiveness of available sampling procedures), the
within-herd dynamics of African swine fever virus (ASFV) were modelled for five different scenarios
(simulating spread with current, as well as historic, ASFV strains of different properties as regards
virulence), using a stochastic SEIR epidemic model (Keeling and Rohani, 2008). For scenarios with
viruses of high virulence as those currently circulating in Europe, the pig population is divided into
three classes: susceptible (i.e. uninfected; S), exposed (i.e. infected, but not yet infectious; E) and
infectious (I). The survival rate of pigs or wild boar infected with such ASFV strains is very low, i.e.
< 10% (Guinat et al., 2016) and may thus be ignored for the purpose of the model. For strains of
lower virulence, the pig population is divided into four classes: susceptible (i.e. uninfected; S), exposed
Figure 1: Map of countries with reported outbreaks of African swine fever between 2015 and 2020
(Data sources: ADNS and OIE). It should be noted that the disease is present in most
countries in sub-Saharan Africa, in spite of the absence of outbreak reports during the
period in question (Mulumba-Mfumu et al., 2019)
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(i.e. infected, but not yet infectious; E), infectious (I) and recovered (R). Disease-associated mortality
was assumed to occur at a constant rate during the infectious period.
The force of infection is given by,
kðtÞ ¼ b I(t)
N(t)
where b is the transmission rate, I(t) is the number of infectious pigs and N(t) is the total number of
pigs at time t. This formulation assumes homogeneous mixing (i.e. individuals uniformly and randomly
contact each other) and frequency-dependent transmission (i.e. the number of contacts is independent
of the population size) (Keeling and Rohani, 2008). The durations of the latent (time between infection
by ASFV and the pigs becoming infectious) and infectious periods were assumed to follow gamma
distributions with means lE and lI and shape parameters kE and kI, respectively (i.e. with variances
lE
2/kE and lI
2/kI). This was incorporated in the model by subdividing the latent and infectious classes
into kE and kI stages each of mean duration lE/kE and lI/kI, respectively (Anderson and Watson,
1980).
The number of pigs in each class in the model takes integer values, while transitions between
compartments are stochastic processes. The number of transitions of each type during a short time
interval dt was drawn from a binomial distribution with the number of pigs in the appropriate class n
and transition probability q (the appropriate per capita rate multiplied by dt) as parameters.
The initial herd size was assumed to be 50, 200 or 1,000 pigs. Parameter estimates are given in
Table 1. Those for moderately virulent strains (case fatality equal or below 50%) used in scenarios 1
and 2 (Malta 1978 and The Netherlands 1986, respectively) were estimated from transmission
experiments (de Carvalho Ferreira et al., 2012, 2013). For scenarios 3–5 (scenarios based on Georgia
2007), these parameters were extracted from a study, which inferred transmission parameters from
data on nine outbreaks in the Russian Federation (Guinat et al., 2018). A case fatality of 100% was
used in these three scenarios with different reproduction rates – R0 – (low, medium and high, for
scenarios 3, 4 and 5, respectively), although with similar beta transmission parameters for scenarios 4
and 5 (2.2).
Within-herd dynamics of ASFV
The within-herd dynamics of ASFV is shown in Figure 2. Here, the median (solid line) and 95%
prediction interval (shading) for the number of (from left to right): exposed, infectious, and recovered
pigs, and for the cumulative number of dead pigs, are shown for the five scenarios considered in
Table 1 (rows); these scenarios differ in terms of the R0, beta transmission parameters and disease-
associated mortality rate considered (see details in Table 1).
Table 1: Parameters used for modelling the transmission of African swine fever virus; five different
scenarios were considered based on viruses of different virulence (moderate case fatality
in scenarios 1–2 and high in scenarios 3–5), and different reproduction ratios (R0) (a low,
medium and high R0 was used for scenarios 3, 4 and 5, respectively)
Disease scenario R0 b lE kE lI kI Case fatality (%)
1. Malta 1978 20.4 2.8 5.0 10† 7.3 10† 25
2. The Netherlands 1986 8.1 0.9 5.0 10† 9.0 20† 50
3. Georgia 2007, low 4.8 0.7 6.1 18 6.9 20 100
4. Georgia 2007, medium 13.2 2.2 9.7 28 6.0 25 100
5. Georgia 2007, high 17.4 2.2 9.0 23 7.9 22 100
†: Assumed values based on ranges reported in de Carvalho Ferreira et al. (2013).
R0 – reproduction ratio.
b – transmission rate.
lE – mean latent period.
kE – shape parameter for gamma-distributed latent period.
lI – mean infectious period.
kI – shape parameter for gamma-distributed infectious period.
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Detection of African swine fever virus
For the mathematical model, and in all scenarios, the prevalence of virus-positive pigs was assumed
to correspond to the prevalence of infectious pigs (when parameterising the model, virus positivity was
assumed to correspond to infectiousness).
Some considerations taken when assessing sampling procedures are:
• For moderately virulent strains, pigs in the recovered class were assumed to be seropositive.
• For highly virulent strains, 10% of infectious pigs were assumed to seroconvert prior to death.
This is based on:
i) the latent and infectious period distributions in the model;
ii) a gamma distribution for the time to seroconversion with a shape parameter of 17.8 and a
mean of 20.2 days; and
iii) the latent and infectious periods and time to seroconversion are independent of one another.
• When sampling dead pigs, the probability of detection, pD, was computed using the
hypergeometric distribution (i.e. sampling without replacement), so that
Figure 2: Within-herd dynamics of ASFV in pigs. The plots show the median (solid line) and 95%
prediction interval (shading) for the number of exposed pigs (magenta), infectious pigs
(red), recovered pigs (blue) and cumulative number of dead pigs (cyan) for the five
scenarios considered in Table 1; these scenarios differ in terms of R0, transmission
parameters and disease-associated mortality (rows; see Table 1 for details)
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where M is the total number of dead pigs, and is equal to
M ¼ mBðS(t)þ E(t)þ I(t)þ R(t)Þ þ D(t)
K is the number of dead pigs that are infected (and detectable), being equal to
K ¼ mBI(t)þ D(t)
and SS is the number of dead pigs sampled with mB being the baseline mortality. Baseline
mortality (proportion of pigs dying as a result of non-ASFV reasons each week) was assumed to
be 0.25%, based on 3% post-weaning mortality during a 3-month production cycle.
• The sensitivity and specificity of the diagnostic test used to confirm infection were assumed to be
100%.
3.2. Methodology used in ToR 2
To estimate the time lag between infection and reporting of an ASF suspicion (ToR 2), an extensive
literature search (ELS) was outsourced by EFSA (OC/EFSA/ALPHA/2020/02 – LOT 2). The aim of this
ELS was to answer the epidemiological question of: ‘what is the average, shortest and longest period
of time for an outbreak of ASF to be reported (measured as the number of days from the earliest point
of infection with ASFV, to the time of declaration of a suspicion by the competent authority after the
clinical investigation by an official veterinarian)?’. To answer this question, an ELS on case reports,
papers describing outbreaks or epidemics of ASF, and any other relevant grey literature or data was
carried out. For the inclusion criteria in the ELS, the earliest point of infection had to have been
estimated by carrying out an epidemiological investigation. Papers and other sources of data where
the earliest point of infection was determined purely by subtracting a known incubation period from
the date of the suspicion of the outbreak were excluded. The ELS was restricted to studies conducted
in Europe or describing results obtained in Europe. If none or very few articles were retrieved (less or
equal to 5) in the first search, the search was extended to the rest of the world. The general protocol
used for the ELS is shown in Annex 5 of the Methodology report (EFSA, 2020a).
3.3. Methodology used in ToR 3
Methodology for assessing the effectiveness of the minimum radius of the protection and
surveillance zones
The assessment of radius size of restricted zones (ToR 3), to prevent further disease spread at a
given probability, was performed by using disease transmission kernels (EFSA, 2020a). As studies
investigating the transmission of African swine fever virus between farms included transmission
associated with infected wild boars, studies investigating Classical Swine Fever transmission using
kernels were identified in the published literature instead, and used for this assessment (the protection
and surveillance zones as described in the Animal Health Law only aim to reduce transmission between
domestic pigs, and not that due to wild boar). The functional form, parameter estimates and the 95%
confidence or credible intervals for the parameters (where provided) of the best-fitting kernel were
extracted from each study.
For each kernel, the probability of transmission beyond given distances (if transmission were to
occur from an infected establishment) was computed using the estimates, and the lower and upper
95% confidence limits for the parameters. In addition, the distances, at which a threshold probability
of transmission beyond that distance is reached, were also calculated for each kernel using the
estimates, and the lower and upper 95% confidence limits.
Methodology for assessing the effectiveness of the duration of the protection and
surveillance zones
To estimate the duration of measures in the protection and surveillance zones, the outputs
obtained from the ELS described in Section 3.2 were used. Further details can be found in the
Methodology report (EFSA, 2020a).
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3.4. Uncertainty
A description of the methodology followed to deal with uncertainty is provided in a Methodology
report published by EFSA (EFSA, 2020a).
4. Assessment
4.1. Assessment of sampling procedures (ToR 1)
4.1.1. Assessment of sampling procedures in the event of suspicion or
confirmation of African Swine Fever (ASF)
4.1.1.1. In the event of a suspicion of ASF in an establishment where animals of the
listed species are kept
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures of
animals of listed species in a suspected establishment, based on clinical examination (TOR 1.1) and
laboratory examination (TOR 1.2), in their ability to detect ASFV in kept animals if the disease is
present in that establishment, or to rule it out if not present (Art. 6 (2)). For further details, see
Annexes B and C.
Summary of sampling procedures
The procedure of clinical examination of pigs in suspect herds is enacted in Directive 2002/60/EC
and the ASF Diagnostic Manual (Commission Decision 2003/422/EC, hereinafter called ‘Diagnostic
Manual’) and is described in detail in Annex C.
In summary, sick and anorectic pigs, pigs recently introduced from suspected sources, pigs kept in
subunits recently visited by external visitors and pigs recently recovered from the disease have to be
examined.
If dead or moribund pigs are detected in a suspect establishment, post-mortem examinations must
be carried out, on at least five of these pigs and in particular on pigs that have shown very evident
signs of disease or had high fever before death and died recently. If deemed necessary, the post-
mortem examination of three to four pigs in contact with dead or moribund pigs should be carried out.
Samples from pigs that have been subjected to post-mortem examination (organs or tissues) must be
collected for virological testing. Organ and tissue samples should be collected from at least five pigs.
Blood samples for laboratory testing must also be collected if the competent authority considers
that the observed clinical signs or lesions, that may suggest ASF, are not sufficient to confirm an
outbreak of ASF. Blood samples for laboratory tests must be taken from:
• the suspected pigs and
• from other pigs in each subunit in which the suspected pigs are kept
• 1st Scenario of sampling procedures
• ToR 1.1 and ToR 1.2 in accordance with Mandate
• Article 6(2) of the Delegated Regulation
• Commission Implemented Regulation 2018/1882 on listed species
The following elements of the scenario were taken into consideration for the assessment:
1) It concerns an event of suspicion of ASF in an establishment with kept animals of the listed species;
2) The listed species for ASF as provided in Commission Implemented Regulation 2018/1882 are those
belonging to the Suidae family;
3) Subsequent to the suspicion, the competent authority shall immediately conduct an investigation to
confirm or rule out the presence of the disease;
4) The official veterinarian must perform a clinical examination and collect samples for further laboratory
examination (see Annex C for details on guidelines on how the clinical and laboratory examination
must be carried out).
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The minimum number of samples to be taken for serological tests must allow for the detection of
10% seroprevalence with 95% confidence in the subunit in question. The number of samples to be
taken for virological tests should be decided by the competent authority.
If the inspection in the suspect holding has not indicated the presence of pigs with very evident
signs of disease or that had high fever before death and died recently, the competent authority shall
carry out further examinations in the suspect holding. Another option foresees the clinical examination
of pigs selected at random in the subunits for which a risk of introduction of the ASF virus has been
identified or is suspected. The minimum number of pigs to be examined must allow the detection of
fever, if it occurs, at a prevalence of 10% with 95% confidence in these subunits.
Assessment
Pursuant to the Diagnostic Manual, the establishment can be officially declared an ASF suspect
holding due to clinical or pathological findings in pigs or based on epidemiological findings (direct or
indirect risky contacts with potential sources of infection).
In case of circulation of highly virulent ASFV (such as those strains currently circulating in Europe),
the infected pigs will show signs of the disease following the incubation period. A few days after the
appearance of clinical signs, the infected pigs start to die at an increasing rate (Figure 2).
Below we present more specific results obtained from the model, where the number of infectious
and dead pigs observed for the different scenarios considered in Table 1 are shown.
In Tables 2 and 3 below, the infection prevalence (median and 95% prediction interval of the
number of infectious pigs) at 13 and 23 days post-infection, respectively, and the number of dead pigs
(due to ASF) observed in the preceding week (as estimated using the SEIR model described above)
are presented. The results are shown per scenario, and assuming three different herd sizes (50, 200
and 1,000). The selection of 13 and 23 days was based on the results for ToR 2, where the average
time between infection and the report of a suspicion is assessed (see Section 4.2).
Table 2: Predicted median (95% prediction interval) prevalence (%) of African swine fever virus
infectious pigs at 13 days post-introduction to a pig herd, and number of dead infected
pigs in the preceding week based on a stochastic SEIR epidemic model
Scenario
Infection prevalence (%) at 13 dpi No. dead infected pigs
Herd size Herd size
50 200 1,000 50 200 1,000
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Table 3: Predicted median (95% prediction interval) prevalence (%) of African swine fever virus
infectious pigs at 23 days post-introduction to a pig herd and number of dead infected
pigs in the preceding week based on a stochastic SEIR epidemic model
Scenario
Infection prevalence (%) at 23 dpi No. dead infected pigs
Herd size Herd size
50 200 1,000 50 200 1,000
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The results from the mathematical model presented in Table 2 show that, on average 4–7
infectious animals would be present in an infected pig herd 13 days post-introduction of a highly
virulent virus such as those currently circulating in Europe (scenarios 3–5); further, as shown in
Table 3, after 23 days more than 15 infectious pigs would be present (Table 3, scenario 3).2
In these two tables, the number of dead pigs in the herd the preceding week is also shown for the
two infection dates considered (13 and 23 days). Although the average number of dead ASF infected
pigs is above 5 in all scenarios, it must be noticed that it is also possible that no dead pigs may be
found in the herd (independently of herd size), at 23 days post-infection and even for scenarios where
a high virulence of the strain is assumed (Table 3, scenario 3, where a low R0 is assumed).
This relatively low initial mortality, and the fact that other characteristic clinical signs or pathological
changes may not be present in infected animals at an early stage of the epidemic (further, sick animals
may have been removed prior to the inspection), lead to the conclusion that in a suspect
establishment, ASF cannot be ruled out based purely on clinical examination.
In the event that no moribund or dead pigs were identified in the herd, the diagnostic manual
(Chapter IV A point 3) foresees, as an option, the clinical examination of randomly selected animals.
The minimum number of pigs in each subunit to be examined must allow the detection of fever, if it
occurs, at a prevalence of 10% with 95% confidence. Table 4 shows the number of days needed to
achieve a 10% prevalence of infection in a herd/subunit with the 95% prediction interval. In this table,
it is shown that a minimum of 6 and a maximum of 45 days could elapse before a 10% prevalence of
infection is observed. Considering that not all infected animals may develop clinical signs (including
fever), it can be concluded that aiming to detect infection based on the random sampling of animals
for clinical examination could lead to a very late detection.
In the event that the suspicion is raised due to moribund or dead pigs found in the herd, the
minimum number of dead pigs and pigs showing clinical signs to be sampled, to detect ASF with a
Table 4: Predicted median (and 95% prediction interval) time (days post introduction) to 10%
infection prevalence of African swine fever virus in a pig herd
Scenario
Time to 10% infection prevalence
Herd size
50 200 1,000































Infection prevalence (%) at 23 dpi No. dead infected pigs
Herd size Herd size
50 200 1,000 50 200 1,000




































2 Average of the prevalence observed for each of the three herd sizes.
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95% confidence, are shown in Table 5. This table was created using the RiBESS+ tool3 and takes into
account the minimum number of dead pigs that will be present at the farm the week preceding the
sampling. For the scenarios where sufficient numbers of dead pigs were not observed, the presence of
at least one clinically infected animal was assumed. The design prevalence used was calculated using
the mathematical model for each of the scenarios considered, and for the different herd sizes; a
Uniform distribution (0.9, 0.99) of the test sensitivity of the virological diagnostic test was used for the
calculations. Three herd sizes were considered 50, 200 and 1,000 pigs. The calculations were repeated
assuming sampling took place 13 (A.) and 23 (B.) days post-infection.
Based on the results shown in Table 5, it can be concluded that the collection of samples (tissue or
blood) from at least five pigs (dead or with clinical signs if a sufficient number of dead pigs is not
found) enables to detect the virus with at least 95% confidence 13 days post infection, even when the
number of dead pigs due to ASF may not have reached the expected level of five pigs per week yet.
Based on the diagnostic manual for ASF, in the event that the observed clinical signs or lesions,
that may suggest ASF, are not sufficient to confirm an outbreak of ASF, blood samples for laboratory
tests must be taken from the suspected pigs and from other pigs in each subunit in which the
suspected pigs are kept; among the latter, the minimum number of samples to be taken for serological
tests must allow for the detection of 10% seroprevalence with 95% confidence. The number of days
needed to achieve a 10% seroprevalence was investigated using the ASF mathematical model
previously described and are shown in Table 6. Table 6 shows the time (median and 95% prediction
interval) to reach 10% seroprevalence in a herd for each of the scenarios considered, and for three
different herd sizes. The number of dead pigs observed in the preceding week is also shown.
The results of the model analysis demonstrate that a 10% prevalence of seropositive animals in a
herd will not be reached before 30 days (median) after introduction of an ASFV strain of high virulence
(Table 6, scenarios 3–5). Furthermore, reducing the seroprevalence to be detected, would not lead to
an early detection in these scenarios either, as the average seroprevalence observed at day 23 post-
introduction only reached > 5% in small herds (range 3–7%) and never > 3% (range 0.2–2.9%) in
herds with 200 pigs or more (overall median 1.8%; results not shown). The larger the herd, the longer
the time it will take to reach a 10% prevalence. The model also shows that at the time a 10%
seroprevalence is reached in the herd, the number of dead pigs in the preceding week would be ≥ 5,
Table 5: Number of sampled animals by category (dead and showing clinical signs) needed to
achieve 95% confidence in the detection of African swine fever virus in an infected herd
(RiBESS+ analysis)




Dead Clinical Dead Clinical Dead Clinical
1. Malta, 1978 3 0 3 0 4 0
2. The Netherlands, 1986 2 1 3 0 4 0
3. Georgia, 2007 low) 2 1 3 1 4 1
4. Georgia, 2007 (medium) 2 1 3 1 4 1
5. Georgia, 2007 (high) 2 1 3 1 4 1




Dead Clinical Dead Clinical Dead Clinical
1. Malta, 1978 2 0 2 0 2 0
2. The Netherlands, 1986 2 0 3 0 3 0
3. Georgia, 2007 (low) 2 0 3 0 3 0
4. Georgia, 2007 (medium) 2 0 3 0 3 0
5. Georgia, 2007 (high) 2 0 3 0 3 0
3 https://efsa.openanalytics.eu/app/ribess
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regardless of scenario and herd size. Thus, sampling of dead pigs would always allow for an earlier
confirmation of the disease than serological testing aiming at a 10% seroprevalence.
For virus strains of lower virulence, such as those that circulated in Europe between the 1960s and
1990s (Scenarios 1 and 2), within-herd seroprevalences as high as 80% have been reported (Ordas
et al., 1981). In case of suspicion of circulation of a virus strain of lower virulence, the random sampling
of pigs according to the present guidelines would allow to detect the presence of a seropositive animal
in a herd after (on average) 14–36 days post introduction4 (Table 6, scenarios 1–2). However, according
to the model output, also for viruses of lower virulence, sampling of dead pigs would allow for an earlier
confirmation of the disease than serological testing aiming at detecting a 10% seroprevalence.
Development of new procedures
At an early stage of the epidemic, ASF cannot be ruled out based on clinical or pathognomonic
examination; this should be highlighted in any new guidelines.
Randomly selecting pigs for the detection of fever (assuming a 10% prevalence and with a 95%
confidence) should not be recommended if the aim is early detection; likewise the random sampling of
pigs aiming at detecting a 10% seroprevalence, would lead to a late detection and it is not
recommended. Regardless of the virulence of the ASFV strain in question (i.e. for either highly virulent
strains as those currently circulating or strains of lower virulence), sampling of dead pigs and pigs with
clinical signs would lead to an earlier detection.
The procedure foreseeing the testing of randomly selected animals in suspect holdings (Commission
Decision 2003/422/EC Chapter IV A point 5) could be excluded and substituted with targeted sampling
of dead and moribund animals.
4.1.1.2. For the purposes of the epidemiological enquiry as referred to Article 57 of
Regulation (EU)2016/429 in an establishment affected and officially confirmed
with ASF
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures,
based on laboratory examination (ToR 1.2), in their ability to detect the disease in the event of preventive
killing and in their ability to support the epidemiological investigation (disease detection, prevalence
estimation, virus identification etc.) in kept animals of listed species in an affected establishment, before
or when they are killed or found dead. The purposes of the epidemiological enquiry are described in
Article 57 of Regulation (EU)2016/429. For further details, see Annexes B and C.
Table 6: Predicted median (95% prediction interval) time (days post introduction) to 10%
seroprevalence of African swine fever virus in a pig herd and number of dead infected pigs
in the preceding week based on a stochastic SEIR epidemic model
Scenario
Time to 10% seroprevalence
Number of dead infected pigs in the
preceding week
Herd size Herd size
50 200 1,000 50 200 1,000

























































†: Was never reached before all animals were dead.
4 Minimum and maximum average observed considering scenarios 1 and 2.
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Summary of sampling procedures
According to the Chapter IV B of the Diagnostic Manual, in a herd where pigs are killed following
confirmation of the disease, blood samples for serological tests have to be collected at random from
pigs of every subunit of the holding when they are killed. The minimum number of samples to be
taken from each subunit of the holding must enable the detection of 10% seroprevalence of the
infection with 95% confidence in the subunit in question.
Samples for virological tests must also be taken in accordance with the instructions of the
competent authority, which will take into account the range of tests that can be performed, the
sensitivity of the laboratory tests that will be used and the epidemiological situation.
In those areas where the presence of ASFV-infected competent vectors (soft ticks) have been
previously demonstrated, appropriate collections of soft ticks for virological tests must be taken in
accordance with the instructions of the competent authority and Annex III to Directive 2002/60/EC.
Assessment
Laboratory testing aiming at detection of 10% seroprevalence of the infection with 95% confidence
in the subunit in question cannot be considered effective in detecting the infected subunits of an
affected herd (see assessment under Section 4.1.1.1).
Development of new procedures
The procedure foreseeing the serological testing of randomly selected animals in other subunits of
an affected holding (Commission Decision 2003/422/EC Chapter IV B) with the aim of disease
detection could be excluded and substituted with targeted sampling of dead or moribund animals, or
those with any clinical signs (e.g. fever, reluctance to move and/or showing signs of anorexia). The
sampling should be performed before killing of pigs. Nonetheless, serological testing of the same
animals could be recommended as a new procedure to better understand how long the virus may
have been circulating in the herd.
Alternative methods for sampling and testing of pigs in outbreak holdings could be introduced to
speed up and support the epidemiological investigation by increasing the number of samples collected
and tested at the outbreak farm with limited extra labour needed. It has been demonstrated that
blood samples collected from pigs or wild boar with cotton swabs can effectively be used for virus DNA
and antibody detection with traditional laboratory tests like PCR and ELISA, respectively (Petrov et al.,
2014; Sauter-Louis et al., 2020), but also with pen side tests like lateral flow devices (LFD) for ASFV
antibody and antigen detection (Carlson et al., 2018). Testing larger numbers of pigs in the herd may
give a better understanding of the development of the epidemic in an affected herd and help to
establish the likely route of introduction of the virus.
• 2nd Scenario of sampling procedures
• ToR 1.2 in accordance with Mandate
• Article 12(3) and the Art. 7 (4) (Preventive killing) of the Delegated Regulation
• Article 57 of the Regulation (EU) 2016/429
The following elements of the scenario were taken into consideration for the assessment:
1) It concerns an affected establishment officially confirmed;
2) Kept animals of listed species found dead or before/when they are killed are sampled;
3) Competent authority collects samples for laboratory examination;
4) The purposes of the sampling are:
a) supporting the epidemiological enquiry to:
i) identify the likely origin of the disease;
ii) calculate the likely length of time that the disease is present;
iii) identify establishments where the animals could have contracted the disease and movements
from the affected establishment that could have led to the spread of the disease; and
iv) obtain information on the likely spread of the listed disease in the surrounding
environment, including the presence and distribution of disease vectors
b) confirming/ruling out disease in the event of preventive killing.
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4.1.1.3. For granting a specific derogation from killing animals of the categories
described in article 13.2 of the Delegated Regulation in an ASF affected
establishment
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures
based on clinical (ToR 1.1) and laboratory (ToR 1.2) examinations of the animals of listed species
belonging to the categories described in article 13(2) of an affected establishment, in order to grant a
specific derogation from killing these animals, while ensuring that they do not pose a risk for the
transmission of the disease. For further details, see Annexes B and C.
Summary of sampling procedures
There are no sampling procedures to grant a derogation from killing of animals in an affected
establishment.
Assessment
Animals in an affected establishment and for which a specific derogation from killing has been
granted should be subjected to clinical surveillance, including laboratory examinations. Sampling
procedures should ensure that the animals do not pose a risk of transmission if left alive.
Animals of the holding that are negative for antibodies and for virus do not pose any risk of
transmission of ASF. Recovered animals with antibody-positive results only do not pose a risk of
transmission but should be monitored for viraemia and virus excretion for a period of 1 year to exclude
risk of transmission due to intermittent or persistent virus excretion.
Development of new procedures
Blood sampling of all surviving animals for virus detection by relevant diagnostic test should be
performed with 3 months interval over 1-year period. During that period, the animals must be kept in
isolation and under strict biosafety conditions, including protection against competent arthropod
vectors.
Sentinel animals comingled with surviving animals could also be used to exclude any virus
transmission. Sentinel animals have to be tested with the same interval and methods as surviving
animals.
• 3rd Scenario of sampling procedure
• ToR 1.1 and ToR 1.2 in accordance with Mandate
• Article 13(3)c of the Delegated Regulation
The following elements of the scenario were taken into consideration during for the assessment:
1) It concerns an affected establishment where infection is officially confirmed;
2) In the establishment where there are kept animals of listed species of the following specific categories
animal categories based on article 13(2):
a) animals kept in a confined establishment
b) animals kept for scientific purposes or purposes related to conservation of protected or
endangered species
c) animals officially registered in advance as rare breeds
d) animals with a duly justified high genetic, cultural or educational value
3) the competent authority may grant specific derogation from killing all the animals of listed species
belonging to any of the above categories in an affected establishment, provided that specific conditions
are fulfilled;
4) The animals should be subjected to clinical surveillance, including laboratory examinations;
5) Sampling procedures should ensure that the animals do not pose a risk of transmission of the category
A disease if left alive.
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4.1.1.4. For wild animals of the listed species within the ASF affected establishment and
its surroundings
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures,
based on clinical (ToR 1.1) and laboratory (ToR 1.2) examinations of the wild animals of listed species
within the affected establishment and in its surroundings. The purpose of the sampling procedures is
to ensure the detection of the virus, if the virus is present in these wild species. For further details, see
Annexes B and C.
Summary of sampling procedures
No guidelines for the sampling of wild animals of listed species are described for animals within an
establishment and its surroundings.
Assessment
In case wild boars have entered the territory of the affected establishment (e.g. pastures), there is
a risk of dispersal of the virus into the wild boar population in the surroundings of the affected
establishment. Contrarily, infection may have originated in the wild boar population, being wild boars
the source of infection for pigs in the establishment. The sampling procedures should ensure the
detection of the infection in wild boars caught within the establishment and found dead or hunted in
its surroundings to support the management of the related risks.
Development of new procedures
If incursion of wild boars to the territory of the establishment has occurred and those animals have
been caught and culled, blood and tissue samples should be collected for laboratory examination and
virus and antibody detection with relevant diagnostic tests performed.
Enhanced passive surveillance (wild boar carcass search) in the area surrounding the establishment
should be implemented. All wild boar found dead should be tested for virus and antibodies. If hunting
is ongoing in the surrounding, the shot animals should also be tested.
4.1.1.5. For animals of listed species in the non-affected establishments located in a
protection zone
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures
based on clinical (ToR 1.1) and laboratory (ToR 1.2) examinations of the animals of listed species in
establishments located in the protection zone. The purpose of the sampling procedures is to ensure
the detection of the virus, if the virus is present in these animals. For further details, see Annexes B
and C.
• 5th Scenario of sampling procedures
• TOR 1.1 and TOR 1.2 in accordance with Mandate
• Article 14(1) of the Delegated Regulation
• Article 57 of the Regulation (EU) 2016/429
• Commission Implemented Regulation 2018/1882 on listed species
The following elements of the scenario should be taken into consideration during for the assessment:
1) It concerns to an affected and officially confirmed establishment;
2) Wild animals of listed species may exist within the establishment and in the surroundings of the
establishment;
3) The competent authority may establish these sampling procedures in addition to other measures;
4) The purpose of the sampling procedures in wild animals of listed species is to ensure the detection of
the virus, if the virus is present in these wild species.
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Summary of sampling procedures
According to the Chapter IV F of the Diagnostic Manual, sick and anorectic pigs, pigs recently
introduced from suspect sources, pigs kept in subunits recently visited by external visitors and pigs
recently recovered from the disease have to be examined clinically.
If dead or moribund pigs are detected in an establishment, post-mortem examinations must be
carried out on at least five of these pigs and in particular on pigs that have shown very evident signs
of disease or had high fever before death and died recently. If deemed necessary, the post-mortem
examination of three to four pigs in-contact with dead or moribund pigs should be carried out.
If the inspection in the holding has not indicated the presence of the pigs referred above, the
competent authority shall carry out further examinations in the holding. The clinical examination on
pigs selected at random in the subunits of the holding with the minimum number of pigs to be
examined, allowing the detection of fever if it occurs at a prevalence of 10% with 95% confidence in
these subunits, must be carried out.
Blood samples for serological tests must be taken from all holdings in the protection zone. The
minimum number of blood samples to be taken must allow for the detection of 10% seroprevalence
with 95% confidence in pigs in each subunit in the holding.
Aside, based on the Strategic approach to the management of African Swine Fever for the EU –
Rev. February 2020, SANTE/7113/2015 – Rev 12, continuous/weekly sampling should be applied in
domestic pig establishments located in areas covered by Decision 2014/709/EU. In this working
document, sampling of at least two dead post-weaning pigs or pigs older than 2 months in each
epidemiological unit for virus detection is prescribed during the period the restricted zone in question.
For herds with mortality rates < 2 pigs/week in the target age group (e.g. small herds, breeding/
multiplier herds) all post weaning pigs or pigs older than 2 months dying during the period in which
the protection zone is in force should be tested.
Assessment
For points already discussed in Section 4.1.1.1, the assessment remains as per Section 4.1.1.1.
In relation to the continuous sampling of at least two dead pigs, the predicted time (median and
95% confidence) to detect ASFV when testing two dead pigs weekly is shown in Table 7. The
simulated time to detection is also shown in Figure 3.
This sampling scheme will detect the virus in an affected herd at median times of 10–14 days post-
infection and, with 95% confidence, assuming a 3% baseline mortality over the whole production cycle
in the target age groups (see Table 7).
• 6th Scenario of sampling procedures
• ToR 1.1 and ToR 1.2 in accordance with Mandate
• Article 26(2) of the Delegated Regulation
The following elements of the scenario should be taken into consideration during for the assessment:
1) It concerns the protection zone with radius up to 3 km;
2) Official veterinarians must visit at least once all the non-affected establishments with kept animals of
listed species located in the protection zone;
3) Among others, they must perform a clinical examination of kept animals of listed species and if
necessary, collection of samples for laboratory examination;
4) The purpose of sampling procedures is to confirm or rule out the presence of a category A disease.
Control measures of African Swine Fever
www.efsa.europa.eu/efsajournal 23 EFSA Journal 2021;19(1):6402
Development of new procedures
No new sampling procedures are needed. Nonetheless, as mentioned in Section 4.1.1.1, the testing
of randomly selected animals could be substituted with the sampling of dead animals (passive
surveillance). Further, the weekly collection of tissue samples from at least two dead post weaning pigs
or pigs older than 2 months in each epidemiological unit as described in the ‘Strategic approach to the
management of African Swine Fever for the EU’ (SANTE/7113/2015) to be applied for the sampling of
Table 7: Median (95% prediction interval) time to detecting African swine fever virus when testing




Malta 1978 11 (3, 17) 11 (3, 18) 12 (5, 20)
The Netherlands 1986 10 (2, 19) 11 (2, 20) 14 (4, 24)
Georgia 2007, low 11 (6, 16) 11 (6, 16) 12 (7, 27)
Georgia 2007, medium 10 (5, 14) 10 (5, 17) 12 (6, 24)
Georgia 2007, high 11 (7, 17) 11 (7, 18) 14 (7, 25)
Figure 3: Simulated time to detection (days post-introduction) of ASFV in a pig herd when testing
two dead pigs each week. The plots show the time to detection in a herd of 50 (left), 200
(middle) or 1,000 (right) pigs for five scenarios which differ in R0, transmission parameters
and disease-associated mortality (rows; see Table 1 for details). The vertical dotted
lines demarcate the weekly sampling periods
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establishments in restricted zones located in areas covered by Decision 2014/709/EU, could be applied
also for the purpose of this scenario.
4.1.1.6. For non-affected establishments located in a surveillance zone
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures,
based on clinical (ToR 1.1) and laboratory (ToR 1.2) examinations of the animals of listed species, for
the sampling of the establishments located within the surveillance zone. The purpose of the sampling
procedure is to ensure disease detection if the virus is present in establishments within the surveillance
zone. For further details, see Annexes B and C.
Summary of sampling procedures
According to the Chapter IV G of the Diagnostic Manual, sick and anorectic pigs, pigs recently
introduced from suspected sources, pigs kept in subunits recently visited by external visitors and pigs
recently recovered from the disease have to be examined.
If dead or moribund pigs are detected in a holding, post-mortem examinations must be carried out,
on at least five of these pigs and in particular on pigs that have shown very evident signs of disease or
have had high fever before death and died recently. If deemed necessary, the post-mortem
examination of three to four pigs in contact with dead or moribund pigs should be carried out.
Blood samples for serological tests must be taken from holdings, where sampling is deemed
necessary by the competent authority and from all semen collection centres. The minimum number of
blood samples to be taken must allow for the detection of 10% seroprevalence with 95% confidence
in pigs in each subunit in the holding.
Assessment
See Sections 4.1.1.1 and 4.1.1.5.
Development of new procedures
The weekly sampling of at least two dead pigs could also be carried out in all establishments within
the surveillance zone according to Section 4.1.1.5 and as described in the ‘Strategic approach to the
management of African Swine Fever for the EU’ (SANTE/7113/2015).
• 8th Scenario of sampling procedures
• ToR 1.3 in accordance with Mandate
• Article 41 of the Delegated Regulation
The following elements of the scenario were taken into consideration for the assessment:
1) Ιt concerns the surveillance zone;
2) Sample of the establishments of kept animals of listed species in the surveillance zone;
3) Official veterinarians carry out visits to all establishments among others perform clinical examination of
kept animals of listed species and if necessary, collection of samples for laboratory examination;
4) The purpose of sampling procedure is to ensure the detection of the disease if the disease is present in
any of the establishments.
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4.1.2. Assessment of sampling procedures to grant derogations for animal
movements
4.1.2.1. From non-affected establishments located in the protection zone to
slaughterhouses located within the protection zone or in the surveillance zone or
outside the restricted zone
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures
based on clinical and/or laboratory examinations of the animals of an establishment in a protection
zone, in order to grant a derogation from prohibitions in the movement of animals, and allow for the
animals to be moved to a slaughterhouse located within the protection zone or in the surveillance zone
or outside the restricted zone (Art29). For further details, see Annexes B and C.
Summary of sampling procedures
Pursuant to the ASF diagnostic manual (Commission Decision 2003/422/EC) Chapter IV D, within
the 24-h period before moving the pigs:
a) the first, sick and anorectic pigs, pigs recently introduced, pigs kept in subunits recently
visited by external visitors and pigs recently recovered from the disease have to be examined
clinically. This should include taking the body temperature.
b) a clinical examination of pigs must be carried out in each subunit in which the pigs to be
moved are kept. In case of pigs older than 3–4 months, this examination must include taking
the temperature of a proportion of pigs allowing for the detection of fever if it occurs at a
prevalence of 20% with 95% confidence in the subunits in question.
Blood samples for serological tests or blood or organ samples such as tonsil, spleen or lymph nodes
for virological tests must be taken at slaughter from pigs proceeding from each of the subunits from
which pigs have been moved. The minimum number of samples to be taken must allow for the
detection of 10% seroprevalence or virus prevalence with 95% confidence in each subunit.
Assessment
For points already discussed in Section 4.1.1.1, the assessment remains as per Section 4.1.1.1.
For the option of sampling in order to detect a 10% virus prevalence, the results of the model
analysis show that days needed to achieve a 10% prevalence of infection in a herd/subunit is at a
minimum of 6 and a maximum of 45 days (Table 4). Considering that animals to be moved to the
slaughterhouse have been clinically examined prior to dispatch and only animals with no clinical
suspicion are permitted to move, it is highly unlikely that the prevalence of the infection among the
animals submitted to slaughterhouse could be 10%.
As a conclusion, the virological testing according to the present guidelines with the aim of detecting
presence of virus at the slaughterhouse cannot be considered effective.
Development of new procedures
The weekly sampling of two dead pigs if carried out in protection and surveillance zones according
to Section 4.1.1.5 and as described in the ‘Strategic approach to the management of African Swine
• 9th Scenario of sampling procedures
• ToR 1.4 in accordance with Mandate
• Article 28(5) of the Delegated Regulation
• Article 29 of the Delegated Regulation
The following elements of the scenario were taken into consideration for the assessment:
1) It concerns the protection zone;
2) Grant derogation for movement of kept animals of listed species from a non-affected establishment in
the protection zone;
3) Animals to be moved to a slaughterhouse located within the protection zone or in the surveillance zone
or outside the restricted zone;
4) Clinical examinations and laboratory examination of animals kept in the establishment, including those
animals to be moved.
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Fever for the EU’ (SANTE/7113/2015), would lead to an early detection of the disease, and therefore is
recommended as it would allow for the safe movement of animals.
4.1.2.2. From non-affected establishments located in the protection zone to a plant
approved for processing or disposal of animal by-products in which the animals
are immediately killed
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures
based on clinical and/or laboratory examinations of the animals of an establishment in a protection
zone, in order to grant derogation from prohibitions in the movement of these animals to a plant
approved for processing or disposal of animal by-products in which the kept animals are immediately
killed (Art37). For further details, see Annexes B and C.
Summary of sampling procedures
No specific sampling procedures are described.
Assessment
See Sections 4.1.1.1 and 4.1.1.5.
Development of new procedures
Same as for 4.1.2.1.
4.1.2.3. From an establishment in a surveillance zone to a slaughterhouse located within
or outside the restricted zone and from an establishment outside the surveillance
zone to a slaughterhouse situated in the surveillance zone
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures based on
clinical and/or laboratory examinations of the animals of listed species in order to grant derogation from
prohibitions and allow for these animals to be moved: a) from an establishment in a surveillance zone to a
slaughterhouse located within or outside the restricted zone, b) from an establishment outside the surveillance
zone to a slaughterhouse situated in the surveillance zone. For further details, see Annexes B and C.
• 12th Scenario of sampling procedures
• ToR 1.4 in accordance with Mandate
• Article 28(5) and article 37 of the Delegated Regulation
The following elements of the scenario were taken into consideration for the assessment:
1) It concerns the protection zone;
2) To grant derogation for movement of kept animals of listed species from a non-affected establishment
in the protection zone;
3) The animals to be moved to a plant approved for processing or disposal of animal by-products in which
the kept animals are immediately killed;
4) Clinical examinations and laboratory examinations of animals kept in the establishment, including those
animals to be moved.
• 13th Scenario of sampling procedures
• ToR 1.4 in accordance with Mandate
• Article 43(5) and article 44 of the Delegated Regulation
The following elements of the scenario were taken into consideration for the:
1) It concerns kept animals of listed species of the establishments in the surveillance zone;
2) To grant derogation for movement from an establishment in the surveillance zone to be moved to a
slaughterhouse within the restricted zone or outside the restricted zone;
3) To grant derogation for movement from an establishment outside the surveillance zone to a
slaughterhouse situated in the surveillance zone;
4) Clinical examinations and laboratory examination of animals kept in the establishment, including those
animals to be moved.
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Summary of sampling procedures
No specific sampling procedures are described.
Assessment
See Sections 4.1.1.1 and 4.1.1.5.
Development of new procedures
Same as for Section 4.1.2.1.
4.1.2.4. From an establishment in a surveillance zone to an establishment belonging to
the same supply chain, located in or outside the surveillance zone
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures
based on clinical and/or laboratory examinations of kept ungulates of listed species in order to grant
derogation and allow to be moved from an establishment in the surveillance zone to an establishment
belonging to the same supply chain, located in or outside the surveillance zone, in order to complete
the production cycle before slaughter. For further details, see Annexes B and C.
Summary of sampling procedures
No specific sampling procedures are described.
Assessment
Procedures suggested for establishments in the surveillance zone as described in Section 4.1.1.6
should already be in place assuring early detection of the disease in the establishments within the
zone. Clinical and laboratory examination of animals to be moved would provide additional confidence
in disease freedom in these animals.
Development of new procedures
The continuous passive surveillance as described in Section 4.1.1.6 should be complemented with
clinical examination of all animals at dispatch.
In the absence of dead post weaning pigs or pigs older than 2 months in each epidemiological unit,
for continuous passive surveillance in the establishment during the period before dispatch this could be
replaced by sampling of live animals and testing of blood samples for virus (with relevant diagnostic
test, e.g. PCR testing). However, to allow early detection, every animal in the group to be dispatched
must be tested for virus.
4.1.2.5. From an establishment located in the restricted zone to move within the
restricted zone when restriction measures are maintained beyond the period set
out in Annex XI of the Delegated Regulation
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures
based on clinical and/or laboratory examinations of the animals of an establishment located in the
restricted zone of an outbreak in order to allow their move within the restricted zone, when restriction
• 15th Scenario of sampling procedures
• ToR 1.4 in accordance with Mandate
• Article 43(5) and article 45(2) of the Delegated Regulation
The following elements of the scenario were taken into consideration for the assessment:
1) It concerns the surveillance zone;
2) Grant derogation for movement of kept animals of listed species;
3) from the surveillance zone;
4) To be moved to an establishment belonging to the same supply chain, located in or outside the
surveillance zone, to complete the production cycle before slaughter;
5) Clinical examinations and laboratory examination of animals kept in the establishment, including those
animals to be moved.
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measures are maintained beyond the period set out in Annex XI of the Delegated Regulation. For
further details, see Annexes B and C.
Summary of sampling procedures
Clinical examination for African swine fever has to be carried out by an official veterinarian in
accordance with the checking and sampling procedures laid down in Part A of Chapter IV of the Annex
to Commission Decision 2003/422/EC (see Section 4.1.1.1) on the date of shipment, or at least twice a
year with an interval of at least 4 months provided additional safety measures have been followed.
According to implementing Decision 2014/178/EU, the pigs have to be subjected to laboratory testing
for ASF carried out with negative results on samples taken in accordance with the sampling procedures as
laid down in the plan for the eradication ASF. The present eradication plans implemented in EU affected
countries foresee weekly sampling of at least two dead 60 days or older pigs for ASF virus detection.
Additionally, the pigs of the holding must have been subjected at least twice a year, with an interval
of at least 4 months, to inspections by the competent veterinary authority, which included sampling for
laboratory testing in accordance with the sampling procedures laid down in Part A of Chapter IV of the
Diagnostic Manual (see Section 4.1.1.1).
Assessment
See Sections 4.1.1.1 and 4.1.1.5.
Development of new procedures
Same as for Section 4.1.2.1.
4.1.3. Assessment of sampling procedures for repopulation purposes
4.1.3.1. For the animals that are kept for the repopulation prior to their introduction
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures
based on laboratory examinations of the animals that are kept for the repopulation prior to their
introduction to rule out the presence of the disease. For further details, see Annexes B and C.
• 18th Scenario of sampling procedures
• ToR 1.4 in accordance with Mandate
• Article 56(1) of the Delegated Regulation
The following elements of the scenario were taken into consideration for the assessment:
1) It concerns the restricted zone when restriction measures are maintained beyond the period set out in
Annex XI;
2) To grant derogation for movement of kept animals of listed species from an establishment within the
restricted zone;
3) Clinical examinations and laboratory examination of animals kept in the establishment, including those
animals to be moved.
• 19th Scenario of sampling procedures
• ToR 1.5 in accordance with Mandate
• Article 59(2) of the Delegated Regulation
The following elements of the scenario were taken into consideration for the assessment:
1) It concerns the repopulation of a previous affected establishment;
2) Animals intended to repopulation shall be sampled prior to their introduction into the establishment of
destination;
3) The samples shall be collected from a representative number of animals to be introduced of each
consignment from each establishment or from a representative number of animals of each consignment
(if animals are all to be introduced at different times or from different establishments of origin);
4) Laboratory examinations;
5) The purpose sampling procedures is to rule out the presence of the disease.
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Summary of sampling procedures
There are no specific procedures for sampling of animals intended for repopulation.
Assessment
If the animals intended for repopulation originate from a holding located in a surveillance zone, the
procedures in place for movement of pigs to other establishments from such holdings will apply. See
Section 4.1.1.5.
If the pigs intended for repopulation come from a disease-free area, there are no requirements for
prior testing of pigs before being moved and general regulations in place for moving live pigs will apply.
In areas where biological vectors are present, ASFV presence in soft tick vector species should be
ruled out before introducing animals for repopulation.
Development of new procedures
As per Section 4.1.1.5.
4.1.3.2. In the event of unusual mortalities or clinical signs being notified during
the repopulation
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures
based on laboratory examinations of the animals that have been repopulated, in the event of unusual
mortalities or clinical signs being notified during the repopulation; to rule out the presence of the
disease. For further details, see Annexes B and C.
Summary of sampling procedures
According to Part E of Chapter IV of the Annex to the Decision 2003/422/EC after any
reintroduction of pigs, the competent authority shall ensure that in case of any disease or death of the
pigs in the holding due to unknown reasons, the pigs in question are immediately tested for ASF.
Assessment
Assuming that the animals in question will be tested for the presence of ASFV, the present
procedures can be considered effective for early detection of ASF in the repopulated animals.
Development of new procedures
None.
4.1.3.3. For animals that have been repopulated
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures
based on laboratory examinations of the animals that have been repopulated, on the last day of the
monitoring period calculated forward from the date on which the animals were placed in the
repopulated establishment. In case the repopulation takes place in several days, the monitoring period
will be calculated forward from the last day in which the last animal is introduced in the establishment.
For further details, see Annexes B and C.
• 20th Scenario of sampling procedure
• ToR 1.5 in accordance with Mandate
• Article 59(9) of the Delegated Regulation
The following elements of the scenario were taken into consideration for the assessment:
1) It concerns the repopulated establishment;
2) Unusual mortalities or clinical signs during the repopulation;
3) The official veterinarians shall without delay collect samples for laboratory examination;
4) The purpose of sampling procedures is to rule out the presence of the disease.
Control measures of African Swine Fever
www.efsa.europa.eu/efsajournal 30 EFSA Journal 2021;19(1):6402
Summary of sampling procedures
According to Part E of Chapter IV of the Annex to Decision 2003/422/EC, when pigs are
reintroduced into a holding, blood samples must be collected at the earliest 45 days after the
reintroduction of the pigs.
In the holding where the disease occurrence has not been linked to vectors:
a) In case sentinel pigs are reintroduced, blood samples for serological tests must be taken at
random from a number of pigs that allow for the detection of 10% seroprevalence with 95%
confidence in each subunit of the holding,
b) In case of total repopulation, blood samples for serological tests must be taken at random
from a number of pigs that allow for the detection of 20% seroprevalence with 95%
confidence in each subunit of the holding.
When pigs are reintroduced into a holding where the disease occurrence has been linked to
vectors:
a) In case sentinel pigs are reintroduced, blood samples for serological tests must be taken at
random from a number of pigs that allow for the detection of 5% seroprevalence with 95%
confidence in each subunit of the holding,
b) In case of total repopulation, blood samples for serological tests must be taken at random
from a number of pigs that allow for the detection of 10% seroprevalence with 95%
confidence in each subunit of the holding and that procedure must be repeated at the earliest
60 days after total repopulation.
Assessment
See Section 4.1.1.5.
Development of new procedures
As per Section 4.1.1.5.
4.2. Assessment of the length of the monitoring period
The concept of the monitoring period was introduced as a management tool for the investigation
and control of suspected and confirmed outbreaks of Category A diseases in terrestrial animals. This
tool aimed to standardise the methodology by which relevant authorities responded to suspected and
confirmed cases of these diseases. In this regard, a disease-specific monitoring period was set for
each of the 14 diseases included in the Category A list. Throughout the EU legislation, the monitoring
period is used as an aid in the control of these diseases, although the specific purpose in which the
monitoring period is used varies depending on the articles of the legislation.
The length of the monitoring period for each disease is set out in Annex II of the Commission
Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 supplementing the rules laid down in Part III of Regulation (EU)
2016/429 (Animal Health Law).
Annex D in this Opinion describes the seven scenarios for which an assessment of the length of the
monitoring period for ASF had been requested.
For the assessment of this ToR, the methodology described in Section 2.3 of the Technical Report
published by EFSA was followed. In essence, in order to assess the length of the monitoring period,
the purpose of this monitoring period for each of the scenarios was ascertained.
• 21st Scenario of sampling procedure
• ToR 1.5 in accordance with Mandate
• Article 59(5) of the Delegated Regulation
The following elements of the scenario were taken into consideration for the assessment:
1) It concerns the repopulated establishment;
2) Animals that have been used for repopulation;
3) Laboratory examinations;
4) Sampling procedures to rule out the presence of the disease.
Control measures of African Swine Fever
www.efsa.europa.eu/efsajournal 31 EFSA Journal 2021;19(1):6402
To answer all scenarios except scenario 5, an extensive literature search (ELS) on the average,
shortest and longest period of time between the earliest point of infection of domestic pigs with a ASF
virus, and the time of reporting of a suspicion by the competent authority, was carried out. The time
period between reporting of a suspicion and the notification of the disease was also assessed. Several
outcomes were designed for the ELS as shown in the protocol, and the results are presented below.
To answer scenario 5, a literature search was conducted by EFSA on the seroconversion period in
domestic pigs, as well as the time when antibodies are no longer detectable in blood, with the outputs
being discussed with relevant experts.
4.2.1. Results
Period between the earliest point of infection and suspicion report
A search was carried out identifying 457 references published after 1/1/2000. Among these
references, 31 were selected to be included in the qualitative review. The full selection process is
displayed in Figure 4.
The majority of the references reported dates instead of periods (26 references out of 31); these
dates were used to calculate the periods of interest. Information on the main outcome of interest, the
period between the earliest point of infection and the suspicion report, was retrieved in nine
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Figure 4: PRISMA diagram ASF Monitoring period ELS
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Based on the results from Table 8, the shortest period was 3 days, and was observed in the
context of an outbreak that took place in 2016 in a small backyard farm (three pigs) in Lithuania.
However, the way the introduction date was estimated is not indicated in the reference.
The longest delay was 23 days, and was based on data collected in a Bulgarian backyard farm
during the 2018 outbreak (Zani et al., 2019). The estimation was made by back-calculating the
introduction date from the date of death of the index case and considering a maximum survival time
of 10 days after the infection. The average period was calculated as 13 days.
Seroconversion period
In experimental studies with ASFV from North-eastern or Southern Estonia (genotype II),
seroconversion in wild boar or domestic pigs was detected from 10 days post inoculation (dpi) using
ELISA (Nurmoja et al., 2017; Gallardo et al., 2018). In the study by Nurmoja et al. (2017), a doubtful
result in ELISA was, however, observed at 9 dpi, and the latest seroconversion in inoculated wild boar
was reported at 13 dpi (Nurmoja et al., 2017). Using immunoperoxidase test (IPT), seroconversion
was observed in inoculated and in-contact pigs between 8.5  1.29 dpi and 13.12  2.23 (min. and
max.) days post exposure (dpe), respectively (Gallardo et al., 2018).
In an experimental study in domestic pigs with an ASFV from Lithuania (genotype II)
seroconversion was observed (in two in-contact pigs) from 18 days dpe using ELISA. Using IPT, one
inoculated and five in-contact pigs yielded positive results between 17 and 21 dpi/dpe (Gallardo et al.,
2015).
In domestic pigs infected with The Netherlands’86 virus strain (genotype I), seroconversion was
observed from 10 dpi using ELISA (Petrov et al., 2018). ASFV p73-specific antibodies were detected by
ELISA in sera from all but one initially infected pig 4–9 days after the individual onset of clinical signs,
with this onset taking place in most animals between 4 and 6 dpi, leading to a detectable serological
response from 10 to 14 dpi.
The authors in this paper believed that failure in the initial challenge may have explained this
longer time to first detectable serological response, as some of the pigs may have got infected through
contact to sick pen-mates. These animals developed fever at a later stage and tested negative after
the initial challenge for a prolonged period of time. All pigs were found antibody-positive using ELISA
from 29 dpi (Petrov et al., 2018).
Table 8: Summary of African Swine Fever literature extraction for the outcome ‘period between




Period between earliest point of
infection and suspicion report (days)
Animal Health - Regulatory Committee
(2014)
Lithuania 2014 181
Nurmoja et al. (2020) Estonia 2015–2017 11 (7–20)2
Animal Health - Regulatory Committee
(2016)
Lithuania 2016 3; 93
OIE Standing Group of Experts on
African swine fever in Europe (2017)
Romania 2017 54
Lamberga et al. (2020) Latvia 2017–2018 13; 225
Animal Health - Regulatory Committee
(2018)
Romania 2018 54
Zani et al. (2019) Bulgaria 2018 235
Nielsen et al. (2017) Denmark NA 13–196
Andraud et al. (2019) France NA 11; 156
1: Based on laboratory findings of seropositive animals.
2: Median (min–max) estimated based on the number of sick or dead animals and the presence of PCR positive and/or
seropositive animals at the time of suspicion.
3: Unclear introduction routes, ‘investigations ongoing’.
4: Based on date of introduction of infected animals.
5: Based on the date of death of index case and considering the maximum survival time of 10 days after the infection.
6: Based on transmission model and disease/mortality thresholds for detection.
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4.2.2. Assessment
Considering the results presented above, an assessment of the effectiveness of the monitoring
period for ASF, depending on the purpose of that period in the different scenarios shown in Annex D,
was carried out. For ASF, the length of the existing monitoring period is 15 days.
Scenarios 1, 2 and 3
For the first three scenarios, the main purpose of the use of the monitoring period is to be able to
carry a full epidemiological investigation (i.e. in scenarios 1 and 2, at the time of the suspicion and
confirmation, respectively), or part of the epidemiological investigation (i.e. scenario 3 where the aim
is to identify any possible epidemiological links between the affected establishment and any separated
non-affected epidemiological units). The length of the monitoring period should then dictate how far
back or forward the activities related to tracing (and other activities needed during an epidemiological
investigation) should go (checks for production records, animal movement records etc.). This
monitoring period is the time where the infection could have been present unknowingly in an
establishment, and due to the regular activities carried out in this establishment, could have spread to
other epidemiological units. In the case of scenario 3, if no epidemiological links between the
establishment that has been confirmed positive and the other epidemiological units are found during
the investigation (and only if other conditions described in the legislation are met), a derogation from
killing the animals in the separated non-affected epidemiological units could be granted.
The period of time when the disease could have been present, unknowingly, in an establishment,
equates then to the time period between the entry of the ASFV into the establishment, and the
reporting of the suspicion. Once the suspicion has been officially reported, control measures are
implemented, and further spread is in this way prevented.
Based on the ELS carried out and presented above, the average length of the time between
infection and the suspicion report was estimated as 13 days based on articles where an
epidemiological investigation was carried out. Although the existing monitoring period is longer that
the average calculated using this methodology, it is important to take into account that most
references displaying short periods between introduction and the suspicion report referred to either:
• a very small farm (e.g. Lithuania, 2016 in backyard farms of 2–3 pigs)
• establishments where high awareness was expected (e.g. Romania, 2017–2018: region bordering
Ukraine)
• 1st Scenario of monitoring period
• ToR 2 in accordance with article 8 and Annex II of the Delegated Regulation
• Article 57 of the Regulation (EU) 2016/429
• Aim: to assess the effectiveness of the length of the Monitoring Period, as the time period calculated
backwards from the date of the notification of the suspicion of a category A disease in an establishment
with kept animals of listed species, for the purposes of the epidemiological enquiry in the event of a
suspicion of an ASF outbreak
• 2nd Scenario of monitoring period
• ToR 2 in accordance with article 17(2) and Annex II of the Delegated Regulation
• Article 57 of the Regulation (EU) 2016/429
• Aim: to assess the effectiveness of the length of the Monitoring Period, as the time period calculated
backwards from the date of notification of the suspicion of a category A disease in an establishment with
kept animals of listed species, for the purposes of the epidemiological enquiry in the event of confirmation
of an ASF outbreak
• 3rd Scenario of monitoring period
• ToR 2 in accordance with article 13(b) and Annex II of the Delegated Regulation
• Aim: to assess the effectiveness of the length of the Monitoring Period, as the time period calculated
backwards from the date of confirmation of a ASF outbreak in an epidemiological unit in which the disease
has not been confirmed, in order to provide derogations from killing the animals in this unit, if this unit
has been completely separated, and handled by different personnel during this monitoring period
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In affected countries, most ASF outbreaks in the domestic pig sector are found in backyard
establishments. In these establishments, many different types of housing arrangements are plausible,
leading to a faster or slower transmission of the virus, resulting in large differences in the period
between entry and suspicion of the disease as seen in this literature search. Therefore, the length of
the monitoring period is considered effective only for outbreaks occurring in small farms, where the
death of a small number of pigs would represent a large percentage of the pigs in the establishment
and therefore would be more evident, or in case of high degree of awareness in the area. At the early
stages of an outbreak, the proportion of dead pigs would be very small in large herds and could be
missed. In those cases, extending the length of the monitoring period to the longest length of 23 days
shown in the results is recommended.
This would be particularly relevant for the third scenario, where the identification or not of potential
links between the affected farm and the unaffected epidemiological unit may lead to the derogation of
killing of the animals in the unaffected unit.
Scenario 4
The main purpose of the monitoring period in scenario 4 is to ensure that certain products or
materials, likely to spread the disease, that have been produced in a non-affected establishment
located in the protection zone of an affected establishment, can be moved safely and without posing a
risk of disease spread. In this scenario, and in contrast with the previous three scenarios, the
establishment of concern is neither a suspect establishment nor an affected establishment. For the
assessment of this scenario, we assume that the earliest plausible point of infection of these products
or materials in the establishment of concern would be the earliest plausible point of infection of the
establishment that originated the protection zone. If these products have been obtained or produced
before the earliest point of infection of the affected establishment, then they could be exempted from
prohibitions to be moved, as long as other conditions specified in the legislation are met (e.g. the
products must have been clearly separated during the production process, storage and transport, from
products not eligible for dispatch outside the restricted zone).
As discussed for scenarios 1–3, as the proportion of dead pigs at the early stages of an outbreak
would be very small in large herds, extending the length of the monitoring period to the longest length
of 23 days shown in the results is recommended. Alternatively, the sampling procedures described in
Section 4.1.1.5 could be implemented.
Scenario 5
The aim of the monitoring period is to ensure that semen from animals in a non-affected
establishment (located in a protection or surveillance zone) that has been collected and frozen after the
earliest time of infection of the affected establishment that originated the protection zone, is safe to be
moved without posing a risk of disease spread. In this scenario, EFSA is requested to assess the length of
time, after the semen was taken, when the animal should be tested in order to allow that semen to be
moved. Here, it is assumed that the earliest point of infection of the animal would be on, or after the
earliest point of infection of the affected establishment that originated the protection zone, and the latest
date the semen could have become contaminated would be the date the semen was collected.
• 4th Scenario of monitoring period
• ToR 2 in accordance with article 27(3)c and Annex II of the Delegated Regulation
• Aim: to assess the effectiveness of the length of the Monitoring Period, as the time period calculated
backwards from the date of notification of the suspicion of the ASF outbreak in the protection zone.
Products or other materials likely to spread the disease, must had been obtained or produced, before this
time period in order to be exempted from prohibitions of movements
• 5th Scenario of monitoring period
• ToR 2 in accordance with article 32 (c), article 48(c) and Annex II of the Delegated Regulation
• The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of the length of the Monitoring Period, as the time
period calculated forwards from the date of semen collection from animals of listed species kept in approved
germinal product establishments in the protection or in the surveillance zone, to prove that the donor animal
has tested favourable on a sample taken not earlier than 7 days after the monitoring period
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In the case of an ASF outbreak, based on the existing legislation, the pigs would have to be tested
not earlier than the time in days of the monitoring period plus 7 days (15 + 7= 22 days) counted after
the semen was taken.
Due to the high case fatality of ASF, the likelihood of infected domestic pigs surviving and going
undetected after 22 days would be very low (as also discussed above). Aside, there is uncertainty
regarding detection of ASFV in semen; no studies have been found documenting this. According to
Penrith and Vosloo (2009), sexual transmission of ASFV in pigs has not been documented but the
authors mention that ASFV is shed in genital secretions. Greig and Plowright (1970) did indeed detect
infectious ASFV in vaginal swabs obtained from ASFV-infected pigs. They also sampled preputial swabs
from boars but results from these swabs are not presented/mentioned in their paper.
Despite this, and assuming that missing an infected establishment as described above would be
plausible, below we summarise the assessment in the case that domestic pigs need to be sampled via
serology in order to assess the infection status of the animal at the time the semen was taken
(indicating whether the semen was infected or not). A negative serological test, if carried out at the
right time, would indicate that the animal has never been exposed to the agent, and therefore, it will
indicate that the semen is free of the agent too.
Taken into account the results presented in Section 2.1.2, the existing length of time requested by
the Delegated Regulation (22 days) prior to the sampling of the animal is considered effective, since it
would be sufficient to ensure that a pig infected with ASF virus on the day the semen was taken,
would have detectable antibodies by either ELISA or IPT.
Scenarios 6 and 7
In scenarios 6 and 7, the monitoring period is used in the context of repopulation. In scenario 6,
the monitoring period is used to ensure that the repopulation process is not put at risk due to the
disease still being present unknowingly in establishments within the surrounding area of the
establishment to be repopulated (if an establishment tested positive to ASF virus within a distance
equal or lower to the radius of the surveillance zone, the repopulation process could not take place).
Repopulation can only take place after a number of days equal to the monitoring period has elapsed
since the final cleaning, disinfection and disinfestation (in areas where soft ticks of the genus
Ornithodoros are present) of the affected establishment.
In this regard the number of days of the monitoring period for ASF counted from the day of the
final cleaning and disinfection must ensure enough time for any potentially infected surrounding
establishment to be reported as a suspicion. Considering the results presented above, and taking into
account that a good level of awareness is expected due to the disease having been present in the
area, the EFSA AHAW Panel considers the existing length of the monitoring period (15 days) effective,
as it would allow for the identification of any potentially infected establishment in the surrounding area
prior to the repopulation taking place.
In scenario 7, the monitoring period must be counted forwards from the date in which the first
animal is introduced into the establishment to be repopulated, with all the animals intended for
repopulation of this establishment being introduced within the length of time of this monitoring period.
The aim of the monitoring period in this scenario is to ensure the early detection of any potentially
recently infected animal intended for repopulation once they have been moved into the repopulated
• 6th Scenario of monitoring period
• ToR 2 in accordance with article 57 (1) and Annex II of the Delegated Regulation
• Aim: to assess the effectiveness of the length of the Monitoring Period, as the time period calculated
forward from the date of the final cleaning and disinfection in an affected establishment, after which the
repopulation of the establishment may be allowed by the competent authority (assuming relevant control
of insects and rodents was carried out)
• 7th Scenario of monitoring period
• ToR 2 in accordance with article 59 (4) and Annex II of the Delegated Regulation
• Aim: to assess the effectiveness of the length of the Monitoring Period, as the time period calculated
forward from the date the first animal was introduced for the purpose of repopulation, during this
monitoring period, all animals of the listed species intended for repopulation should be introduced
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establishment. Although the preferred option is that all animals are introduced into the establishment
to be repopulated at the same time, this is not always feasible. The first clinical and laboratory
sampling of the repopulated animals takes place once all the animals are in situ. By restricting the
period of time during which animals may be introduced into the establishment, the period of time
during which the disease could be unknowingly spreading within the establishment is reduced.
Assuming that the latest point of infection of the first pig or batch of pigs introduced into the
repopulated establishment is the day when the animals are moved, clinically ill pigs would be observed
at the first visit, if this visit is carried out a number of days equal to the incubation period. The EFSA
AHAW Panel considers the existing length of the monitoring period (15 days) effective as it would
allow for early detection of potentially infected pigs at the first visit following re-stocking.
4.3. Assessment of the minimum radius and time periods of the
protection and surveillance zones set in place subsequent to a
disease outbreak
4.3.1. Assessment of the minimum radius
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness to control the spread of ASF by
implementing a protection and surveillance zones of a minimum radius, as set out in Annex V of the
Delegated Regulation, surrounding the establishment where the disease has been confirmed. Based on
this regulation, the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zone for ASF should be of 3 and
10 km, respectively (see Annex E).
Results
To answer this ToR, transmission kernels have been used to analyse outbreak data for two
epidemics of Classical Swine Fever in Europe. As transmission kernels have not been estimated for
African swine fever, it was decided to use available kernels for CSF for this purpose. Three publications
were found describing kernel functions for CSF based on the two European outbreaks, namely Backer
et al. (2009) and Boender et al. (2014) using data from the CSF epidemic in the Netherlands in 1997–
1998 and (Gamado et al., 2017) using UK data from the year 2000.
All studies used the same functional form for the kernel, namely,
k(r) ¼ ð1þ ðr=d0ÞaÞ1
where k is the kernel, r is the distance to an infected farm, d0 is the distance at which the kernel is
reduced by 50% and a is the parameter controlling how rapidly the kernel declines with distance.
Parameters were estimated using data from the 1997–1998 epidemic in the Netherlands (Backer
et al., 2009; Boender et al., 2014) and the 2000 epidemic in the UK (Gamado et al., 2017) (Table 9).






The Netherlands 1997–1998 1.0 2.2 Backer et al. (2009)
The Netherlands 1997–1998 0.55 (0.42, 0.73) 2.27 (2.15, 2.40) Boender et al. (2014)
UK 2000 0.28 (0.04, 5.53) 1.71 (0.94, 3.80) Gamado et al. (2017)
*: 95% confidence intervals are shown in brackets if they were reported in the original reference.
Control measures of African Swine Fever
www.efsa.europa.eu/efsajournal 37 EFSA Journal 2021;19(1):6402
For the three kernels in Table 9, the probability of transmission beyond given distances (if transmission
were to occur from an infected establishment) was computed using the estimates, lower 95% confidence
limits and upper 95% confidence limits, including beyond the proposed radius for the protection and
surveillance zones (3 km and 10 km, respectively) (Figure 5). In addition, the distances at which a
threshold probability of transmission beyond that distance is reached were also calculated for each kernel
using the estimates, lower 95% confidence limits and upper 95% confidence limits (Figure 6). The
corresponding values computed using the estimates are summarised in Tables 10 and 11.
Figure 5: Kernels for the transmission of Classical swine fever used as a proxy for African swine fever
for assessing the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zones
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Figure 6: Assessment of the radius of the protection and surveillance zone for African swine fever
virus assuming the same transmission kernels as for CSF. The top panel shows the
probability of transmission beyond a given distance (if transmission were to occur from an
infected establishment) computed using the estimates (blue circles) and the lower and
upper 95% confidence limits (error bars) for each kernel (and in the same order as) in
Table 9. The thick black line indicates the median probability for all kernels. The black
dotted lines indicate threshold probabilities of 0.05 and 0.01. The bottom panel shows the
distances at which a threshold probability of transmission beyond that distance is reached
when calculated using the estimates (circles) and lower and upper 95% confidence limits
(error bars) for each kernel. The thick black line indicates the median distance for all
kernels. The black dotted lines indicate distances of 3 and 10 km (i.e. the proposed radius
of the protection and surveillance zones, respectively)
Table 10: Probability of transmission of African swine fever virus beyond different distances
assuming the same transmission kernels as for CSF
Distance (km)
3 5 10 15 20 25 50
Median 0.02 0.007 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 < 0.001
Minimum 0.02 0.006 0.001 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
Maximum 0.08 0.03 0.006 0.003 0.001 0.001 < 0.001
Table 11: Distances (km) at which the probability of transmission of African swine fever virus
beyond that distance reaches a threshold level
Threshold probability of transmission
0.001 0.005 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.5
Median 15.9 6.2 4.2 2.0 1.4 1.0 0.6
Minimum 11.5 5.7 4.1 1.6 1.0 0.6 0.3
Maximum 23.1 11.1 8.1 3.8 2.7 1.9 1.0
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Assessment
Based on the kernel results above, if transmission occurs from an infected farm, the median relative
probability of transmission beyond the protection (3 km) and surveillance zones (10 km) is 2 and
0.2%, respectively. In several articles of the AHL, a threshold of 95% is used for different purposes; if
we use this threshold as to determine whether or not the minimum radius is efficient, the assessment
based on the data presented will lead to the conclusion that the minimum radius is highly effective
if/when focusing on the control of the spread of the disease among and between domestic pig herds.
Using the same threshold, hypothetical protection and surveillance zones with radii of 2 and 4 km,
respectively, would also be considered effective. Nonetheless, it is crucial to note that these
probabilities do not take into account the risk of transmission due to wild boar.
In the absence of estimated transmission kernels for ASF, this assessment was based on kernels for
the transmission of CSF. Despite the similarities suggested by the names, and, to a large extent,
shared typical clinical presentation, these two diseases are caused by completely different viruses,
something that may be a source of bias for this assessment. However, given that (1) the two diseases
share main transmission routes in the European context, and (2) CSF is considered more contagious
with higher levels of shedding in all secretions, and thus more prone to indirect and local spread than
ASF (Schulz et al., 2017), any bias caused by using the CSF kernel is thus likely to underestimate the
effectiveness of the minimum radius for ASF.
4.3.2. Assessment of the minimum period
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness to control the spread of disease of the
minimum periods during which the competent authority should apply the restriction measures in the
protection and surveillance zones as set out in Annex X and XI (for ASF).
The length of the minimum period of the protection zone and surveillance zone is 15 and 30 days,
respectively (see Annex E). In the protection zone, all farms are visited for a clinical inspection. This
aims to quickly identify infected farms where infection has started before control measures were
implemented. The movement control applies for 30 days, ensuring that possibly infected pigs in both
protection and surveillance zones are not moved to uninfected farms.
From Table 8 in Section 4.2.1, it follows that the median time between introduction and suspicion is
13 days. The maximum period between introduction and suspicion is 23 days. Consequently, a period
of 30 days for the movement ban is effective to detect infected pig farms and to prevent the
movement of infected pigs from the surveillance zone.
4.3.3. Uncertainty analysis
Although several sources of uncertainty were identified during the scientific assessment (see
Annex F), their impact on the outputs of the assessment could not be quantified.
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5. Conclusions and Recommendations
Sampling procedure
Laboratory guidelines based on Commission
Decision 2003/422/EC if not stated
otherwise
Conclusions Recommendations
4.1.1.1 In the event of a
suspicion of ASF in an
establishment where
animals of the listed
species are kept
Chapter IV A.
4. Samples of the organs or tissues from pigs that
have been subjected to post-mortem examination
must be collected for virological tests
- These samples must preferably be collected
from recently dead pigs
- Post-mortem examinations may be carried on
three to four in-contact pigs, particularly if
these pigs are showing clinical signs
5. Blood samples for laboratory tests
If further clinical signs or lesions that may suggest
ASF are detected in a suspected holding, but the
competent authority deems that these findings are
not sufficient to confirm an outbreak of ASF and
that laboratory tests are therefore necessary, blood
samples for laboratory tests must be taken from the
suspected pigs and from other pigs in each subunit
in which the suspected pigs are kept, in accordance
with the following procedures: the minimum
number of samples to be taken for serological tests
must allow for the detection of 10% seroprevalence
with 95% confidence in the subunit in question; the
number of samples to be taken for virological tests
will be in accordance with the instructions of the
competent authority, which will take into account
the range of tests that can be performed, the
sensitivity of the laboratory tests that will be used
and the epidemiological situation.
Chapter V B.
For detection of the ASF virus, antigen or genome
from dead or humanely destroyed pigs, tonsils,
lymph nodes (gastrohepatic, renal, submandibular
At an early stage of the epidemic the disease
cannot be ruled out based on clinical or
pathognomonic examination.
Random examination of pigs, in pig subunits,
aiming at the detection of fever (if it occurs)
assuming a prevalence of 10% with 95%
confidence will lead to a late disease detection.
Virological examination of tissue samples, or
blood samples, from at least five dead pigs (and
pigs with clinical signs if less than two dead pigs
found) would allow early virus detection (13 days
post infection, with 95% confidence).
Random serological sampling of pigs (in suspect
herds where no clinical signs are found) to detect
a 10% prevalence with 95% confidence, would
lead to a late detection of the virus (more than 30
days since introduction) in outbreaks caused by
highly virulent strains. Further in these outbreaks
reducing the seroprevalence to be detected,
would not lead to early detection either. In case
of both highly and low virulent strains, sampling
of dead and clinical animals would lead to an
earlier detection.
Randomly selecting pigs for the detection
of fever (assuming a 10% prevalence and
with a 95% confidence) should not be
recommended if the aim is early detection.
Target investigation and sampling of dead
and moribund animals should be used for
early detection as described in the
diagnostic manual.
In the event of finding no clinical signs in
the suspect establishment, the
investigation of random blood samples
(collected to detect 10% prevalence with
95% confidence) is not recommended for
early detection.
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Sampling procedure
Laboratory guidelines based on Commission
Decision 2003/422/EC if not stated
otherwise
Conclusions Recommendations
and retropharyngeal), spleen, kidney and lung
tissues are the most suitable samples (1). In case of
autolysed carcases, an entire long bone or the
sternum is the specimen of choice.
Anticoagulated blood and/or clotted blood samples
must be collected from pigs showing signs of fever
or other signs of disease, in accordance with the
instructions of the competent authority.
(1) It is recommended to collect also samples of
ileum, as they may be useful for the diagnosis of
classical swine fever.
SANTE 7113/2015
2.1.5. Sampling for laboratory investigations will be
performed
a) In case of clinical signs resembling ASF (e.g.
fever or haemorrhagic lesions). If necessary,
sampling should be repeated to exclude ASF
when specific clinical signs occur.
b) Each week, in the form of virological testing of at
least the first two deaths (post weaning pigs or
pigs older than 2months) in each production unit.
c) When ante or post-mortem signs raise suspicion
at home slaughtering at least within the area
covered by Commission Decision 2014/709/EU.
OIE Disease card:
Identification of the agent
A complete set of field samples should be
submitted and especially:
• blood collected during the early febrile stage in
EDTA (0.5%)
• spleen, lymph nodes, tonsil, lungs, kidney and
bonemarrow kept at 4°C
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Laboratory guidelines based on Commission




Serum collected within 8–21 days after infection
in convalescent animals
4.1.1.2. For the purposes
of the epidemiological
enquiry as referred to
Article 57 of Regulation




Chapter IV B. SAMPLING PROCEDURES IN A
HOLDING WHEN PIGS ARE KILLED FOLLOWING
CONFIRMATION OF DISEASE
1. In order that the manner of introduction of the
ASF virus into an infected holding and the length
of time elapsed since its introduction may be
established, when pigs are killed on a holding
following confirmation of an outbreak in
accordance with Article 5(1)(a) of Directive
2002/60/EC, blood samples for serological tests
must be taken at random from the pigs when
they are killed.
2. The minimum number of pigs to be sampled
must allow for the detection of 10%
seroprevalence with 95% confidence in pigs in
each subunit of the holding*.
Samples for virological tests must also be taken in
accordance with the instructions of the competent
authority, which will take into account the range
of tests that can be performed, the sensitivity of
the laboratory tests that will be used and the
epidemiological situation.
In those areas where the presence of vectors
infected with the ASF virus has been previously
demonstrated, appropriate collections of soft ticks
for virological tests must also be taken in
accordance with the instructions of the competent
authority and Annex III to Directive 2002/60/EC.
3. However, in case of secondary outbreaks, the
competent authority may decide to derogate from
points 1 and 2 and establish other sampling
procedures, taking into account the
If the aim is disease confirmation, serological
testing of randomly selected pigs in other
subunits of an affected establishment would not
be of help with early detection in these subunits.
Target investigation and sampling of dead
and moribund animals should be used for
early detection in other units of the
affected establishment and should replace
the random serological sampling. Also,
serological sampling of these dead or
moribund animals is advised.
Testing larger numbers of pigs in the herd
may give a better understanding of the
development of the epidemic in an
affected herd, and help to establish the
likely route of introduction of the virus.
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Sampling procedure
Laboratory guidelines based on Commission
Decision 2003/422/EC if not stated
otherwise
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epidemiological information already available on
the source and means of virus introduction into
the holding and the potential spread of disease
from the holding.
* However, if the derogation provided in Article 6
(1) of Directive 2002/60/EC has been applied,
sampling must concern the subunits of the
holding where pigs have been killed, without
prejudice to the further examinations and
sampling to be carried out on the remaining pigs
in the holding, which shall be carried out in
accordance with the instructions of the competent
authority.
4.1.1.3. For granting a
specific derogation from
killing animals of the
categories of article 13.2
of the Delegated
Regulation in an ASF-
affected establishment
No specific sampling procedures in the legislation Recovered animals with antibody-positive results
only do not pose a risk of transmission but should
be monitored for possible reactivation of viraemia
and virus excretion.
Recovered pigs should be monitored for
viraemia and virus excretion for a period of
one year, with sampling taking place every
three months. If sentinel pigs are used,
they should be sampled with the same
regime as for recovered pigs.
During that period, the animals must be
kept in isolation and under strict biosafety
conditions, including protection against
vector bites.
4.1.1.4. For wild animals
of the listed species




3.1.4. Measures to be taken in infected areas to
eradicate the disease
a) Surveillance (key measure):
i) Principle of sampling should be based on
enhanced passive surveillance: all found
carcasses and sick wild boar have to be
tested for ASF using PCR.
ii) Active patrolling to find carcasses (trained
staff) in order to reinforce passive
surveillance.
iii) It is recommended that samples be
delivered as soon as possible to the
Wild suids within the affected establishment
would be considered as kept animals and thus
any sampling procedure would be the same as for
domestic pigs.
Enhanced passive surveillance (wild boar
carcass search) in the area surrounding
the establishment should be implemented.
All wild boar found dead should be tested
for virus and antibodies. If hunting is
ongoing in the surrounding, the shot
animals should also be tested.
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laboratory max within 48–72 h from the
sampling.
l) Testing for ASF of all wild boar found dead and
culled. All hunted wild boar tested for ASF virus
detection using PCR and for Ab detection.
4.1.1.5. For animals of
listed species in the non-
affected establishments
located in a protection
zone
Chapter IV F.
2. The minimum number of blood samples to be
taken must allow for the detection of 10%
seroprevalence with 95% confidence in pigs in
each subunit in the holding.
However, the derogation provided for in Article 10
(5) and Article 11(4) of Directive 2002/60/EC may
only be granted if the competent authority
ensures that the number of blood samples taken
allow for the detection of 5% seroprevalence with
95% confidence in each subunit in the holding.
Weekly sampling of at least two dead post
weaning pigs or pigs older than 2 months in each
epidemiological unit would lead to virus detection
at median times of between 10 and 14 days post-
infection with 95% confidence, assuming a 3%
baseline mortality.
Random serological sampling of pigs would lead
to a later detection of the virus.
The testing of randomly selected animals
could be excluded and substituted with the
sampling of dead animals (passive
surveillance).
The weekly sampling of at least two dead
post weaning pigs or pigs older than 2
months in each epidemiological unit as
described in the ‘Strategic approach to the
management of African Swine Fever for
the EU’ (SANTE/7113/2015), should be
applied for the sampling of establishments
in restricted zones located in areas





In addition, blood samples for serological tests
must be taken from pigs:
— in any other holding where sampling is
deemed necessary by the competent authority,
— in all semen collection centres.
2. Whenever blood sampling for serological tests
is carried out in holdings located in the
surveillance zone, the number of blood samples
to be taken in these holdings must be in
accordance with section F(2), first sentence.
(2. The minimum number of blood samples to be
taken must allow for the detection of 10%
seroprevalence with 95% confidence in pigs in
each subunit in the holding.)
However, the derogation provided for in Article
See Section 4.1.1.1 and 4.1.1.5. The weekly sampling of two dead pigs
could also be carried out in all
establishments within the surveillance zone
according to Section 4.1.1.5 and as
described in the ‘Strategic approach to the
management of African Swine Fever for
the EU’ (SANTE/7113/2015).
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10(5) and Article 11(4) of Directive 2002/60/EC
may only be granted if the competent authority
ensures that in each holding in the zone blood
samples for serological tests are taken. The
minimum number of blood samples to be taken
must allow for the detection of 5%
seroprevalence with 95% confidence in each
subunit in the holding.
4.1.2.1. From non-
affected establishments
located in the protection
zone to slaughterhouses
located within the






3. The competent authority may authorise the
removal of pigs from the holding concerned, on
condition that:
(e) if the pigs are to be slaughtered or killed, a
sufficient number of samples is then taken from
the pigs in accordance with the diagnostic manual
in order that the presence of African swine fever
virus in these holdings can be confirmed or ruled
out;
Chapter IV D
4. When the pigs referred to in point 3 are
slaughtered or killed, blood samples for
serological tests or blood or organ samples such
as tonsil, spleen or lymph nodes for virological
tests must be taken from pigs proceeding from
each of the subunits from which pigs have been
moved. The minimum number of samples to be
taken must allow for the detection of 10%
seroprevalence or virus prevalence with 95%
confidence in each subunit.
The type of samples to be taken and the test to
be used will be in accordance with the
instructions of the competent authority, which will
take into account the range of tests that can be
performed, the sensitivity of these tests and the
See Section 4.1.1.1
The virological testing with the aim of detecting
the virus at the slaughterhouse in randomly
selected slaughter pigs assuming a virus
prevalence of 10% with 95% confidence cannot
be considered effective.
The weekly sampling of at least two dead
pigs if carried out in protection and
surveillance zones according to
Section 4.1.1.5 and as described in the
‘Strategic approach to the management of
African Swine Fever for the EU’ (SANTE/
7113/2015), would lead to an early
detection of the disease, and therefore is
recommended as it would allow for the
safe movement of animals.
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5. However, if clinical signs or post-mortem
lesions suggesting ASF are detected when the
pigs are slaughtered or killed, by way of
derogation from point 4, the provisions for
sampling laid down in section C shall apply
(C. SAMPLING PROCEDURES WHEN PIGS ARE
KILLED AS A PREVENTIVE MEASURE ON A
SUSPECTED HOLDING).
6. The derogation provided for in Article 10(5)
and Article 11(4) of Directive 2002/60/EC may be
granted if the competent authorities ensure that
an intensive sampling and testing scheme is also
applied on the groups of pigs to be checked or
sampled referred to in points 2, 3 and 4. In the
context of this scheme, the minimum number of
blood samples to be taken must allow for the
detection of 5% seroprevalence with 95%
confidence in the group of pigs in question.
4.1.2.2 From non-
affected establishments
located in the protection
zone to a plant approved
for processing or disposal
of animal by-products in





3. The competent authority may authorise the
removal of pigs from the holding concerned, on
condition that:
(e) if the pigs are to be slaughtered or killed, a
sufficient number of samples is then taken from
the pigs in accordance with the diagnostic manual
in order that the presence of African swine fever
virus in these holdings can be confirmed or ruled
out.
See Sections 4.1.1.1 and 4.1.1.5 Same as for 4.1.2.1
4.1.2.3. From an
establishment in a
surveillance zone to a
slaughterhouse located
within or outside the
Chapter IV A.
4. Samples of the organs or tissues from pigs that
have been subjected to post-mortem examination
must be collected for virological tests
See Sections 4.1.1.1 and 4.1.1.5 Same as for 4.1.2.1
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restricted zone and from
an establishment outside
the surveillance zone to a
slaughterhouse situated
in the surveillance zone
Chapter IV D.
4. When the pigs referred to in previous are
slaughtered or killed, blood samples for
serological tests or blood or organ samples such
as tonsil, spleen or lymph nodes for virological
tests must be taken from pigs proceeding from
each of the subunits from which pigs have been
moved. The minimum number of samples to be
taken must allow for the detection of 10%
seroprevalence or virus prevalence with 95%
confidence in each subunit.
The type of samples to be taken and the test to
be used will be in accordance with the
instructions of the competent authority, which will
take into account the range of tests that can be




surveillance zone to an
establishment belonging
to the same supply
chain, located in or
outside the surveillance
zone
No specific sampling procedures prescribed. No sampling procedure prescribed. However,
procedures suggested for establishments in the
surveillance zone should already be in place
(Section 4.1.1.5). The continuous passive
surveillance as described in Section 4.1.1.6.
Sampling procedure in 4.1.1.5 should be
complemented with clinical examination of
all animals at dispatch.
In the absence of at least 2 dead post
weaning pigs or pigs older than 2 months
during the period before dispatch this
could be complemented by sampling of
live animals. However, to allow early
detection every animal in the group to be
dispatched must be tested.
4.2.1.5 From an
establishment located in





period set out in Annex
Article 3
/. . ./
1. the pigs have been subjected to laboratory
testing for African swine fever carried out with
negative results on samples taken in accordance
with the sampling procedures as laid down in the
plan for the eradication of African swine fever
referred to in the second paragraph of Article 1 of
See Sections 4.1.1.1 and 4.1.1.5 Same as for 4.1.2.1
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XI of the Delegated
Regulation
this Decision within a period of 15 days prior to
the date of the movement/. . ./
2. the pigs come from a holding:
(a) that has been subjected at least twice a year,
with an interval of at least 4 months, to
inspections by the competent veterinary authority,
which/. . ./(ii) included a clinical examination and
sampling in accordance with the checking and
sampling procedures laid down in Part A of Chapter
IV of the Annex to Decision 2003/422/EC;
(c) in which the pigs over the age of 60 days have
been subjected to the laboratory testing for African
swine fever referred to in paragraph 1.
4.1.3.1 For the animals
that are kept for the
repopulation prior to
their introduction
No guidelines described for ruling out the
presence of disease prior to the introduction.
If the pigs intended for repopulation come from a
disease-free area, there are no requirements for
prior testing of pigs before being moved, and
general regulations in place for moving live pigs
will apply.
If pigs originate from a holding located in a
surveillance zone the procedures in place for
movement of pigs to other establishments from
such holdings will apply. See Section 4.1.1.5.
Same as for 4.1.1.5
In areas where biological vectors are
present, ASFV presence in soft tick vector
species should be ruled out before
introducing animals for repopulation.





Blood samples for serological tests
Chapter IV A.
4. Samples of the organs or tissues from pigs that
have been subjected to post-mortem examination
must be collected for virological tests
Chapter E
3. After any reintroduction of pigs, the competent
authority shall ensure that in case of any disease
or death of the pigs in the holding due to
unknown reasons, the pigs in question are
immediately tested for ASF.
Decision 2003/422/EC lays down the procedures
after any reintroduction of pigs. The competent
authority shall ensure that in case of any disease
or death of the pigs in the holding due to
unknown reasons, the pigs in question are
immediately tested for ASF.
None.
4.1.3.3 For animals that
have been repopulated
E.1. When pigs are reintroduced into a holding in
accordance with Article 13(3) (disease has not
See Section 4.1.1.5 Same as for 4.1.1.5
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been linked to vectors), of Directive 2002/60/EC,
the following sampling procedures must be
applied:
• Blood samples must be collected at the
earliest 45 days after the reintroduction of the
pigs,
• In case sentinel pigs are reintroduced, blood
samples for serological tests must be taken at
random from a number of pigs that allow for
the detection of 10% seroprevalence with
95% confidence in each subunit of the
holding,
• In case of total repopulation, blood samples
for serological tests must be taken at random
from a number of pigs that allow for the
detection of 20% seroprevalence with 95%
confidence in each subunit of the holding.
2. When pigs are reintroduced into a holding in
accordance with Article 13(4) (disease has
been linked to vectors) of Directive 2002/60/
EC, the following sampling procedures must
be applied:
• Blood samples must be collected at the
earliest 45 days after the reintroduction of the
pigs,
• In case sentinel pigs are reintroduced, blood
samples for serological tests must be taken at
random from a number of pigs that allow for
the detection of 5% seroprevalence with 95%
confidence in each subunit of the holding,
• In case of total repopulation, blood samples
for serological tests must be taken at random
from a number of pigs that allow for the
detection of 10% seroprevalence with 95%
confidence in each subunit of the holding.
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Then, the procedure laid down in the third
indent above must be repeated at the earliest 60
days after total repopulation.
3. After any reintroduction of pigs, the
competent authority shall ensure that in case
of any disease or death of the pigs in the
holding due to unknown reasons, the pigs in




Assessment of the length
of the monitoring period
of ASF
For scenarios 1–4, the length of the monitoring period is considered
effective only for outbreaks occurring in small farms, where the death of a
small number of pigs would represent a large percentage of the pigs in the
establishment and therefore would be more evident, or in case of high
degree of awareness in the area.
The length of the monitoring period is considered effective for scenarios
5–7.
At the early stages of an outbreak, the proportion of dead pigs would
be very small in large herds and could be missed. In those cases,
extending the length of the monitoring period to the longest length
of 23 days shown in the results is recommended for scenarios 1–4.
Alternatively, the sampling procedures described in Section 4.1.1.5







It was observed that if transmission occurs from an infected farm, the median
relative probability of transmission beyond the protection (3 km) and
surveillance zones (10 km) is 2 and 0.2%, respectively. The minimum radius is
considered highly effective if/when focusing on the control of the spread of the
disease among and between domestic pig herds (more than 95% of the
transmission, if transmission occurs will take place within the protection zone).
It is crucial to note that these probabilities do not take into account the risk of





The duration of measures in the protection and surveillance zones are
considered effective.
It is recommended to maintain the duration of the protection (15
days) and surveillance zones (30 days).
Control measures of African Swine Fever
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CBPP Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia
CCPP Contagious caprine pleuropneumonia
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dpe days post exposure
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ELS extensive literature search
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Annex A – Definitions in EU legislation
Terms Definitions
Clinical examination The clinical examination comprises: (i) an initial general evaluation of the animal health status of the establishment which comprises all the animals of
listed species kept in the establishment; and (ii) an individual examination of the animals included in the sample referred to in point (a). The sampling of
animals for clinical examination is carried out in accordance with point A.1 of Annex I for terrestrial animals (Delegated Regulation article 3)
Confined
establishment
Means any permanent, geographically limited establishment, created on a voluntary basis and approved for the purpose of movements, where the
animals are: (a) kept or bred for the purposes of exhibitions, education, the conservation of species or research; (b) confined and separated from
the surrounding environment; and (c) subject to animal health surveillance and biosecurity measures (AHL: Regulation 2016/429 article 4(48))
Epidemiological unit Means a group of animals with the same likelihood of exposure to a disease agent (AHL: Regulation 2016/429 article 4(39))
Establishment Means any premises, structure, or, in the case of open-air farming, any environment or place, where animals or germinal products are kept,
on a temporary or permanent basis, except for: (a) households where pet animals are kept; (b) veterinary practices or clinics (AHL: Regulation
2016/429 article 4(27))
Health status Means the disease status as regards the listed diseases relevant for a particular listed species with respect to: (a) an animal; (b) animals within:
(i) an epidemiological unit; (ii) an establishment; (iii) a zone; (iv) a compartment; (v) a Member State; (vi) a third country or territory (AHL:
Regulation 2016/429 article 4(34))
Infected zone Means a zone in which restrictions on the movements of kept and wild animals or products and other disease control and biosecurity measures
may be applied with the view to preventing the spread of a category A disease in the event of official confirmation of the disease in wild animals.
(Delegated Regulation article 2(15))
Kept animals Means animals which are kept by humans, including, in the case of aquatic animals, aquaculture animals (AHL: Regulation 2016/429 article 4(5))
Outbreak Means the officially confirmed occurrence of a listed disease or an emerging disease in one or more animals in an establishment or other place
where animals are kept or located (AHL: Regulation 2016/429 article 4 (40)
Protection zone Means a zone around and including the location of an outbreak, where disease control measures are applied in order to prevent the spread of the
disease from that zone (AHL: Regulation 2016/429 article 4(42))
Listed diseases Means diseases listed in accordance with Article 5(1) (AHL: Regulation 2016/429 article 4 (18))
List of the diseases (AHL: Regulation 2016/429, Annex II)
Listed species Means an animal species or group of animal species listed in accordance with Article 8(2), or, in the case of emerging diseases, an animal species
or group of animal species which meets the criteria for listed species laid down in Article 8(2); (AHL: Regulation 2016/429 article 4(20))
List of species and groups of species (Commission Implemented Regulation 2018/1882)
Monitoring periods It is appropriate to follow a single approach for the measures to apply in the event of a category A disease. However, the epidemiology of
diseases should be taken into account to establish the appropriate moment for the competent authority to apply control measures and to carry
out investigations if there is suspicion or confirmation of those diseases. Therefore, ‘monitoring periods’ should be provided, as reference time
frames for each category A disease affecting terrestrial animals based on incubation periods and other relevant elements that may affect the
spread of the disease. (Delegated Regulation whereas 10).
Restricted zone Means a zone in which restrictions on the movements of certain animals or products and other disease control measures are applied, with a view
to preventing the spread of a particular disease into areas where no restrictions are applied; a restricted zone may, when relevant, include
protection and surveillance zones (AHL: Regulation 2016/429 article 4(41))
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Surveillance zone Means a zone which is established around the protection zone, and where disease control measures are applied in order to prevent the spread of
the disease from the protection zone (AHL: Regulation 2016/429 article 4(43))
Wild animals Means animals which are not kept animals (AHL: Regulation 2016/429 article 4(8))
Zone Means: (a) for terrestrial animals, an area of a Member State, third country or territory with a precise geographical delimitation, containing an
animal subpopulation with a distinct health status with respect to a specific disease or specific diseases subject to appropriate surveillance,
disease control and biosecurity measures (AHL: Regulation 2016/429 article 4 (35))
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Annex B – Scenarios of ToR 1
ToRs Legislation Scenario Description of the Scenario Elements of the Scenario
ToR 1.1
ToR 1.2
6(2) of the Delegated
Regulation
1st Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures of animals of listed species in a
suspected establishment, based on clinical examination
(TOR 1.1) and laboratory examination (TOR 1.2), in
their ability to detect a category A disease in kept
animals if the disease is present in that establishment,
or to rule it out if not present (Art. 6 (2)).
• event of suspicion of a category A disease
• in an establishment
• kept animals of listed species
• the competent authority shall immediately conduct
an investigation to confirm or rule out the presence
of the suspected listed disease
• official veterinarians perform clinical examinations
and collect samples for laboratory examinations
ToR 1.2 Art. 12(3),
Art. 7 (4) (Preventive
killing) of the Delegated
Regulation, and Art. 57
Reg.2016/429
2nd Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures, based on laboratory examination
(ToR 1.2), in their ability to detect the disease in the
event of preventive killing, and in their ability to
support with the epidemiological investigation (disease
detection, prevalence estimation, virus identification
etc.) in kept animals of listed species in an affected
establishment, before or when they are killed or found
dead. The purposes of the epidemiological enquiry are
described in Article 57 of Regulation (EU)2016/429.
• affected establishment officially confirmed
• kept animals of listed species found dead or before/
when they are killed
• competent authority collects samples for laboratory
examination
for the purposes of:
a) supporting the epidemiological enquiry:
- to identify the likely origin of the disease
- to calculate the likely length of time that the
disease is present
- to identify establishments where the animals
could have contracted the disease and
movements from the affected establishment that
could have led to the spread of the disease
- to obtain information on the likely spread of the
listed disease in the surrounding environment,
including the presence and distribution of disease
vectors




Article 13(3)c of the
Delegated Regulation
3rd Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on clinical (ToR 1.1) and
laboratory (ToR 1.2) examinations of the animals of
listed species belonging to the categories described in
article 13(2)) of an affected establishment, in order to
grant a specific derogation from killing these animals,
• affected establishment officially confirmed
• kept animals of listed species of specific categories
• animal categories based on article 13(2):
a) animals kept in a confined establishment
b) animals kept for scientific purposes or purposes
related to conservation of protected or
endangered species
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ToRs Legislation Scenario Description of the Scenario Elements of the Scenario
while ensuring that they do not pose a risk for the
transmission of the disease.
c) animals officially registered in advance as rare
breeds
d) animals with a duly justified high genetic,
cultural or educational value
• the competent authority may grant specific
derogation from killing all the animals of listed
species belonging to any of the above categories in
an affected establishment, provided that specific
conditions are fulfilled
• the animals should be subjected to clinical
surveillance, including laboratory examinations
• sampling procedures should ensure that the animals
do not pose a risk of transmission of the category A
disease if left alive
ToR 1.1
ToR 1.2
Article 14(1) of the
Delegated Regulation
Art. 57 Reg.2016/429
4th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on clinical (ToR 1.1) and
laboratory (ToR 1.2) examinations of the animals of
non-listed species kept in an affected establishment, in
their ability to ensure the detection of the virus if the
virus is present in these species.
• kept animals of non-listed species of epidemiological
relevance for the control of the disease
• animals of non-listed species are those animals that
are not listed in Commission Implementing
Regulation (EU) 2018/1882 for each of the category
A diseases
• animal species acting purely as mechanical carriers
of the virus will not be covered
• The competent authority is not obliged to carry out
the sampling of non-listed species, but they may
establish it in addition to other measures
• sampling procedures to ensure detection of the
virus in these species
ToR 1.1
ToR 1.2
Article 14(1) of the
Delegated Regulation
Art. 57 Reg.2016/429
5th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on clinical (ToR 1.1) and
laboratory (ToR 1.2) examinations of the wild animals
of listed species within the affected establishment and
in its surroundings. The purpose of the sampling
procedures is to ensure the detection of the virus, if
the virus is present in these wild species
• affected establishment officially confirmed
• wild animals of listed species within the
establishment and in the surroundings of the
establishment
• the competent authority may establish these
sampling procedures in addition to other measures
• sampling procedures in wild animals of listed species
to ensure the detection of the virus, if the virus is
present in these wild species
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ToR 1.1
ToR 1.2
Article 26(2) of the
Delegated Regulation
6th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on clinical (ToR 1.1) and
laboratory (ToR 1.2) examinations of the animals of
listed species in establishments located in the
protection zone. The purpose of the sampling
procedures is to ensure the detection of the virus, if
the virus is present in these animals.
• protection zone with radius up to 3 km
• non-affected establishments with kept animals of
listed species
• all the non-affected establishments within the
protection zone
• official veterinarians must visit at least once all the
establishments
• among others, they must perform a clinical
examination of kept animals of listed species and if
necessary, collection of samples for laboratory
examination
• sampling procedures to confirm or rule out the
presence of a category A disease
ToR 1.3 Article 26(5) of the
Delegated Regulation
point A.3 of Annex I
7th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures, based on clinical (ToR 1.1) and
laboratory (ToR 1.2) examinations of the animals of
listed species, for the sampling of establishments
located in a protection zone when the radius is larger
than 3 km. The purpose of the sampling procedure is
to ensure disease detection of the virus if the virus is
present in establishments within the protection zone
• protection zone with radius larger than 3 km
• non-affected establishments of kept animals of listed
species
• sample of the non-affected establishments in the
protection zone
• in a protection zone with a radius equal to 3 km,
official veterinarians must carry inspections in all
establishments within the 3 km
• In case of a radius larger than 3 km, official
veterinarians may not visit all establishments, but a
sample of those. EFSA is requested to assess how
many of these establishments should be inspected,
in order to ensure the detection of the virus, if the
virus is present in animals in these establishments
• among others perform clinical examination of kept
animals of listed species and if necessary, collection
of samples for laboratory examination
• sampling procedure to ensure the detection of the
disease if the disease is present in any of these
establishments
ToR 1.3 Article 41 of the
Delegated Regulation
8th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures, based on clinical (ToR 1.1) and
laboratory (ToR 1.2) examinations of the animals of
listed species, for the sampling of the establishments
• surveillance zone
• establishments of kept animals of listed species
• sample of the establishments in the surveillance
zone
Control measures of African Swine Fever
www.efsa.europa.eu/efsajournal 59 EFSA Journal 2021;19(1):6402
ToRs Legislation Scenario Description of the Scenario Elements of the Scenario
located within the surveillance zone. The purpose of
the sampling procedure is to ensure disease detection
if the virus is present in establishments within the
surveillance zone
• official veterinarians carry out visits to a sample of
the establishments
• among others perform clinical examination of kept
animals of listed species and if necessary, collection
of samples for laboratory examination
• sampling procedure to ensure the detection of the
disease if the disease is present in any of the
establishments
Derogations to allow animal movements
ToR 1.4 Article 28(5) of the
Delegated Regulation
Article 29 of the
Delegated Regulation
9th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on clinical and/or
laboratory examinations of the animals of an
establishment in a protection zone, in order to grant a
derogation from prohibitions in the movement of
animals, and allow for the animals to be moved to a
slaughterhouse located within the protection zone or in
the surveillance zone or outside the restricted zone
(Art29)
• protection zone
• kept animals of listed species
• grant derogation for movement from a non-affected
establishment in the protection zone
• to be moved to a slaughterhouse located within the
protection zone or in the surveillance zone or
outside the restricted zone
• clinical examinations and laboratory examination of
animals kept in the establishment, including those
animals to be moved
ToR 1.4 Article 28(5) and
Article 30(1) of the
Delegated Regulation
10th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on clinical and/or
laboratory examinations, to grant a derogation from
prohibitions in the movement of day-old-chicks located
in the protection zone and hatched from eggs
originating in the restricted zone or outside the
restricted zone. The sampling procedures should
ensure that the movement of these day-old-chicks to
an establishment located in the same Member State
but if possible, outside the restricted zone
• protection zone
• grant derogation for movement from a non-affected
establishment in the protection zone
• day-old-chicks from non-affected establishment
located in the protection zone, hatched from eggs
originating in or outside the restricted zone
• to be moved to an establishment located in the
same Member State but if possible, outside the
restricted zone
• clinical examinations and laboratory examination of
animals kept in the establishment, including those
animals to be moved
ToR 1.4 Article 28(5) and
Article 30(2) of the
Delegated Regulation
11th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on clinical and/or
laboratory examinations, to grant a derogation from
prohibitions in the movement of ready-to-lay poultry
located in the protection zone to establishments
• protection zone
• ready-to-lay poultry
• grant derogation for movement from a non-affected
establishment in the protection zone
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located in the same MS and if possible within the
restricted zone.
• to be moved to an establishment located in the
same Member State and if possible, within the
restricted zone
clinical examinations and laboratory examination of
animals kept in the establishment, including those
animals to be moved
ToR 1.4 Article 28(5) and
Article 37 of the
Delegated Regulation
12th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on clinical and/or
laboratory examinations of the animals of an
establishment in a protection zone, in order to grant
derogation from prohibitions in the movement of these
animals to a plant approved for processing or disposal
of animal by-products in which the kept animals are
immediately killed (Art37)
• protection zone
• kept animals of listed species
• grant derogation for movement from a non-affected
establishment in the protection zone
• to be moved to a plant approved for processing or
disposal of animal by-products in which the kept
animals are immediately killed
clinical examinations and laboratory examinations of
animals kept in the establishment, including those
animals to be moved
ToR 1.4 Article 43(5) and
Article 44 of the
Delegated Regulation
13th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on clinical and/or
laboratory examinations of the animals of listed
species in order to grant derogation from prohibitions
and allow for these animals to be moved: a) from an
establishment in a surveillance zone to a
slaughterhouse located within or outside the restricted
zone, b)from an establishment outside the surveillance
zone to a slaughterhouse situated in the surveillance
zone
• surveillance zone
• kept animals of listed species
• grant derogation for movement from an
establishment in the surveillance zone to be moved
to a slaughterhouse within the restricted zone or
outside the restricted zone
• grant derogation for movement from an
establishment outside the surveillance zone to a
slaughterhouse situated in the surveillance zone
• clinical examinations and laboratory examination of
animals kept in the establishment, including those
animals to be moved
ToR 1.4 Article 43(5) and
Article 45(1) of the
Delegated Regulation
14th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on clinical and/or
laboratory examinations of kept ungulates of listed
species in order to grant a derogation and allow for
the animals to be moved from an establishment in the
surveillance zone to pastures situated within the
surveillance zone
• surveillance zone
• kept ungulates of listed species
• grant derogation for movement from an
establishment in the surveillance zone
• to be moved to pastures situated within the
surveillance zone
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• clinical examinations and laboratory examination of
animals kept in the establishment, including those
animals to be moved
ToR 1.4 Article 43(5) and
Article 45(2) of the
Delegated Regulation
15th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on clinical and/or
laboratory examinations of kept ungulates of listed
species in order to grant derogation and allow to be
moved from an establishment in the surveillance zone
to an establishment belonging to the same supply
chain, located in or outside the surveillance zone, in
order to complete the production cycle before
slaughter
• surveillance zone
• kept animals of listed species
• grant derogation for movement from the
surveillance zone
• to be moved to an establishment belonging to the
same supply chain, located in or outside the
surveillance zone, to complete the production cycle
before slaughter
• clinical examinations and laboratory examination of
animals kept in the establishment, including those
animals to be moved
ToR 1.4 Article 43(5) and
Article 46(1) of the
Delegated Regulation
16th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on clinical and/or
laboratory examinations to grant derogation of
movements of day-old-chicks hatched from
establishment located in the surveillance zone, from
eggs originating within the surveillance zone and eggs
originating outside the restricted zone, to an
establishment located in the same Member State
where they were hatched
• surveillance zone
• kept birds of listed species
• grant derogation for movement of day-old-chicks
hatched from establishment located in the
surveillance zone, from eggs originating from
establishment within the surveillance zone or eggs
originating from outside the restricted zone
• to be moved to an establishment located in the
same Member State
• clinical examinations and laboratory examination of
animals kept in the establishment, including those
animals to be moved
ToR 1.4 Article 43(5) and
Article 46(2) of the
Delegated Regulation
17th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on clinical and/or
laboratory examinations, to grant a derogation from
prohibitions in the movement of ready-to-lay poultry
located in the surveillance zone to establishments
located in the same MS.
• surveillance zone
• ready-to-lay poultry
• to be moved to an establishment located in the
same Member State
• clinical examinations and laboratory examination of
animals kept in the establishment, including those
animals to be moved
ToR 1.4 Article 56(1)c of the
Delegated Regulation
18th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on clinical and/or
• restricted zone when restriction measures are
maintained beyond the period set out in Annex XI
• kept animals of listed species
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laboratory examinations of the animals of an
establishment located in the restricted zone of an
outbreak in order to allow their move within the
restricted zone, when restriction measures are
maintained beyond the period set out in Annex XI
• grant derogation for movement from an
establishment within the restricted zone
• clinical examinations and laboratory examination of
animals kept in the establishment, including those
animals to be moved
Repopulation
ToR 1.5 Article 59(2),(3) of the
Delegated Regulation
19th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on laboratory examinations
of the animals that are kept for the repopulation prior
to their introduction to rule out the presence of the
disease.
• repopulation of a previous affected establishment
• kept animals of listed species
• Animals intended to repopulation shall be sampled
prior to their introduction into the establishment of
destination
• samples shall be collected from a representative
number of animals to be introduced of each
consignment from each establishment or from a
representative number of animals of each
consignment (if animals are all to be introduced at
different times or from different establishments of
origin)
• laboratory examinations
• sampling procedures to rule out the presence of
the disease
ToR 1.5 Article 59(9) of the
Delegated Regulation
20th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on laboratory examinations
of the animals that have been repopulated, in the
event of unusual mortalities or clinical signs being
notified during the repopulation; to rule out the
presence of the disease.
• repopulated establishment
• unusual mortalities or clinical signs during the
repopulation
• the official veterinarians shall without delay collect
samples for laboratory examination
• sampling procedures to rule out the presence of
the disease
ToR 1.5 Article 59(5) of the
Delegated Regulation
21st Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on laboratory examinations
of the animals that have been repopulated, on the last
day of the monitoring period calculated forward from
the date on which the animals were placed in the
repopulated establishment. In case the repopulation
takes place in several days, the monitoring period will
be calculated forward from the last day in which the
last animal is introduced in the establishment.
• repopulated establishment
• kept animals of listed species
• Animals that have been used for repopulation
• Laboratory examinations
• Sampling procedures to rule out the presence of
the disease
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Annex C – Existing sampling procedures for ASF
Sampling scenarios for ASF – Based on Commission Decision 2003/422/EC if not stated otherwise
Scenario Description of the Scenario Clinical guidelines Laboratory guidelines
1st To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures of animals of listed
species in a suspected establishment, based
on clinical examination (TOR 1.1) and
laboratory examination (TOR 1.2), in their
ability to detect a category A disease in kept
animals if the disease is present in that
establishment, or to rule it out if not present
(Art. 6 (2)).
Chapter IV A.
2. Inspection of production and health records;
inspection of each subunit of the holding
Clinical examination must include taking the body
temperature and must primarily concern the following
pigs/group of pigs: sick or anorexic pigs; pigs recently
introduced from confirmed outbreaks or from other
suspected sources; pigs kept in subunits recently
visited by external visitors who had recent close
contact with ASF-suspected or infected pigs or for
whom other particularly risky contacts with a potential
source of the ASF virus have been identified; pigs
already sampled and serologically tested for ASF, in
case the results of these tests do not allow ASF to be
ruled out, and in-contact pigs; pigs recently recovered
from the disease.
If the inspection in the suspected holding has not
indicated the presence of the pigs or group of pigs
referred to in the above subparagraph, the competent
authority, without prejudice to other measures that
may be applied in the holding in question in
accordance with Directive 2002/60/EC and taking into
account the epidemiological situation, shall: carry out
further examinations in the holding in question, or
ensure that blood samples for laboratory tests are
taken from the pigs in the holding in question.
3. The clinical examination in the holding in question
must be carried out on pigs selected at random in the
subunits for which a risk of introduction of the ASF
virus has been identified or is suspected. The minimum
number of pigs to be examined must allow for the
detection of fever if it occurs at a prevalence of 10%
with 95% confidence in these subunits.
4. If dead or moribund pigs are detected in a
Chapter IV A.
4. Samples of the organs or tissues from pigs that
have been subjected to post-mortem examination
must be collected for virological tests
- These samples must preferably be collected from
recently dead pigs
- Post-mortem examinations may be carried on three
to four in-contact pigs, particularly if these pigs are
showing clinical signs
5. Blood samples for laboratory tests
If further clinical signs or lesions that may suggest
ASF are detected in a suspected holding, but the
competent authority deems that these findings are
not sufficient to confirm an outbreak of ASF and that
laboratory tests are therefore necessary, blood
samples for laboratory tests must be taken from the
suspected pigs and from other pigs in each subunit in
which the suspected pigs are kept, in accordance with
the following procedures: the minimum number of
samples to be taken for serological tests must allow
for the detection of 10% seroprevalence with 95%
confidence in the subunit in question; the number of
samples to be taken for virological tests will be in
accordance with the instructions of the competent
authority, which will take into account the range of
tests that can be performed, the sensitivity of the
laboratory tests that will be used and the
epidemiological situation.
Chapter V B.
For detection of the ASF virus, antigen or genome
from dead or humanely destroyed pigs, tonsils, lymph
nodes (gastrohepatic, renal, submandibular and
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suspected holding, post-mortem examinations must be
carried out, preferably on at least five of these pigs
and in particular on pigs that have: shown very evident
signs of disease before death, high fever, died recently.
If these examinations have not shown lesions
suggesting ASF but, due to the epidemiological
situation, further investigations are deemed necessary:
a clinical examination, and blood sampling be carried
out in the subunit where the dead or moribund pigs
were kept; and post-mortem examinations may be
carried out on three to four in-contact pigs, particularly
if these pigs are showing clinical signs. Irrespective of
the presence or absence of lesions suggesting ASF,
samples of the organs or tissues from pigs that have
been subjected to post-mortem examination must be
collected for virological tests. These samples must
preferably be collected from recently dead pigs.
retropharyngeal), spleen, kidney and lung tissues are
the most suitable samples(1). In case of autolysed
carcases, an entire long bone or the sternum is the
specimen of choice.
Anticoagulated blood and/or clotted blood samples
must be collected from pigs showing signs of fever or
other signs of disease, in accordance with the
instructions of the competent authority.
(1) It is recommended to collect also samples of ileum,
as they may be useful for the diagnosis of classical
swine fever.
SANTE 7113/2015
2.1.5. Sampling for laboratory investigations will be
performed
a) In case of clinical signs resembling ASF (e.g. fever
or haemorrhagic lesions). If necessary, sampling
should be repeated to exclude ASF when specific
clinical signs occur.
b) Each week, in the form of virological testing of at
least the first two deaths (post weaning pigs or pigs
older than 2 months) in each production unit.
c) When ante or post-mortem signs raise suspicion at
home slaughtering at least within the area covered
by Commission Decision 2014/709/EU.
OIE Disease card:
Identification of the agent
• A complete set of field samples should be
submitted and especially:
○ blood collected during the early febrile stage
in EDTA (0.5%)
○ spleen, lymph nodes, tonsil, lungs, kidney
and bone marrow kept at 4°C
Serological tests
Serum collected within 8–21 days after
infection in convalescent animals
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2nd To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures, based on laboratory
examination (ToR 1.2), in their ability to
detect the disease in the event of preventive
killing, and in their ability to support with the
epidemiological investigation (disease
detection, prevalence estimation, virus
identification, etc.) in kept animals of listed
species in an affected establishment, before
or when they are killed or found dead. The
purposes of the epidemiological enquiry are




Member States shall ensure that the epidemiological
inquiry in relation to suspected cases or outbreaks of
African swine fever is carried out on the basis of
questionnaires, prepared within the framework of the
contingency plans referred to in Article 21.
Such an inquiry shall deal at least with:
(a) the length of time during which African swine fever
virus may have existed on the holding before the
disease was notified or suspected;
(b) the possible origin of African swine fever on the
holding and the identification of other holdings in
which pigs may have become infected or contaminated
from the same source;
(c) the movement of persons, vehicles, pigs, carcases,
semen, meat or any material which could have carried
the virus to or from the holdings in question;
(d) the possibility that vectors or feral pigs cause the
disease to spread.
If the results of this inquiry suggest that African swine
fever may have spread from or to holdings located in
other Member States, the Commission and the Member
States concerned shall be immediately informed.
Annex
Chapter IV B. SAMPLING PROCEDURES IN A HOLDING
WHEN PIGS ARE KILLED FOLLOWING CONFIRMATION
OF DISEASE
1. In order that the manner of introduction of the ASF
virus into an infected holding and the length of time
elapsed since its introduction may be established,
when pigs are killed on a holding following
confirmation of an outbreak in accordance with Article
5(1)(a) of Directive 2002/60/EC, blood samples for
serological tests must be taken at random from the
pigs when they are killed.
2. The minimum number of pigs to be sampled must
allow for the detection of 10% seroprevalence with
95% confidence in pigs in each subunit of the
holding*.
Samples for virological tests must also be taken in
accordance with the instructions of the competent
authority, which will take into account the range of
tests that can be performed, the sensitivity of the
laboratory tests that will be used and the
epidemiological situation.
In those areas where the presence of vectors infected
with the ASF virus has been previously demonstrated,
appropriate collections of soft ticks for virological tests
must also be taken in accordance with the instructions
of the competent authority and Annex III to Directive
2002/60/EC.
3. However, in case of secondary outbreaks, the
competent authority may decide to derogate from
points 1 and 2 and establish other sampling
procedures, taking into account the epidemiological
information already available on the source and means
of virus introduction into the holding and the potential
spread of disease from the holding.
* However, if the derogation provided in Article 6(1) of
Directive 2002/60/EC has been applied, sampling must
concern the subunits of the holding where pigs have
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been killed, without prejudice to the further
examinations and sampling to be carried out on the
remaining pigs in the holding, which shall be carried
out in accordance with the instructions of the
competent authority.
3rd To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on clinical (ToR
1.1) and laboratory (ToR 1.2) examinations of
the animals of listed species belonging to the
categories described in article 13(2)) of an
affected establishment, in order to grant a
specific derogation from killing these animals,
while ensuring that they do not pose a risk for
the transmission of the disease.
Council Directive 2002/60/EC
Article 5
2. In cases where an outbreak has been confirmed in a
laboratory, a zoo, a wild life park or a fenced area
where pigs are kept for scientific purposes or purposes
related to conservation of species or conservation of
rare breeds, the Member State concerned may decide
to derogate from paragraphs 1(a) and 1(e), provided
that basic Community interests are not adversely
affected.
No specific sampling procedures in the legislation
4th To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures, based on clinical (ToR
1.1) and laboratory (ToR 1.2) examinations of
the animals of non-listed species kept in an
affected establishment, in their ability to
ensure the detection of the virus if the virus is
present in these species.
N/A; There are no non-listed species that can be
infected with ASF.
N/A; There are no non-listed species that can be
infected with ASF.
5th To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures, based on clinical (ToR
1.1) and laboratory (ToR 1.2) examinations of
the wild animals of listed species within the
affected establishment and in its
surroundings. The purpose of the sampling
procedures is to ensure the detection of the
virus, if the virus is present in these wild
species
No guidelines described for animals within
establishment and its surroundings; there are
guidelines for detection of the virus in feral pigs.
SANTE 7113/2015
3.1.4. Measures to be taken in infected areas to
eradicate the disease
a) Surveillance (key measure):
i) Principle of sampling should be based on
enhanced passive surveillance: all found
carcasses and sick wild boar have to be tested
for ASF using PCR.
ii) Active patrolling to find carcasses (trained staff)
in order to reinforce passive surveillance.
iii) It is recommended that samples be delivered as
soon as possible to the laboratory max within
48–72 h from the sampling.
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l) Testing for ASF of all wild boar found dead and
culled. All hunted wild boar tested for ASF virus
detection using PCR and for Ab detection.
6th To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on clinical (ToR
1.1) and laboratory (ToR 1.2) examinations of
the animals of listed species in establishments
located in the protection zone. The purpose
of the sampling procedures is to ensure the




1.(a) A census of all the holdings shall be carried out
as soon as possible; after the establishment of the
protection zone these holdings shall be visited by an
official veterinarian within not more than seven days in
order to conduct a clinical examination of the pigs and
to check the register and the pig identification marks
referred to in Articles 4 and 5 of Directive 92/102/EEC.
4. The measures in the protection zone shall continue
to be applied at least until:
(a) cleansing, disinfection and, if necessary,
disinsectisation
in the infected holdings have been carried out;
(b) pigs on all holdings have undergone clinical and
laboratory examinations carried out in accordance with
the diagnostic manual in order to detect the possible
presence of African swine fever virus.
The examinations referred to in point (b) shall not take
place until 45 days have elapsed since the completion
of preliminary cleansing, disinfection and, if necessary,
disinsectisation measures on the infected holdings.
Chapter IV F.
1. In order that the measures referred to in Article 10
of Directive 2002/60/EC may be lifted in a protection
zone, in all holdings in the zone:
— a clinical examination must be carried out in
accordance with the procedures laid down in
Section A(2) and (3)
Chapter IV F.
2. The minimum number of blood samples to be taken
must allow for the detection of 10% seroprevalence
with 95% confidence in pigs in each subunit in the
holding.
However, the derogation provided for in Article 10(5)
and Article 11(4) of Directive 2002/60/EC may only be
granted if the competent authority ensures that the
number of blood samples taken allow for the detection
of 5% seroprevalence with 95% confidence in each
subunit in the holding.
7th To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures, based on clinical (ToR
1.1) and laboratory (ToR 1.2) examinations of
the animals of listed species, for the sampling
of establishments located in a protection zone
N/A; protection zone radius for ASF is 3 km N/A; protection zone radius for ASF is 3 km
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when the radius is larger than 3 km. The
purpose of the sampling procedure is to
ensure disease detection of the virus if the
virus is present in establishments within the
protection zone
8th To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures, based on clinical (ToR
1.1) and laboratory (ToR 1.2) examinations of
the animals of listed species, for the sampling
of the establishments located within the
surveillance zone. The purpose of the
sampling procedure is to ensure disease
detection if the virus is present in
establishments within the surveillance zone
Council Directive 2002/60/EC
Article 10
4. The measures in the surveillance zone shall continue
to be applied at least until:
(a) cleansing, disinfection and, if necessary,
disinsectisation in the infected holdings have been
carried out;
(b) pigs on all holdings have undergone clinical and,
where necessary, laboratory examinations as laid down
in the diagnostic manual in order to detect the
eventual presence of African swine fever virus.
The examinations referred to in point (b) shall not take
place until 40 days have elapsed since the completion
of preliminary cleansing, disinfection and, if necessary,
disinsectisation measures on the infected holdings.
Chapter IV G
1. In order that the measures referred to in Article 11
of Directive 2002/60/EC may be lifted in a surveillance
zone,
a clinical examination must be carried out in all
holdings in the zone in accordance with the procedures
laid
down in Section A(2).
Chapter IV G
In addition, blood samples for serological tests must
be taken from pigs:
— in any other holding where sampling is deemed
necessary by the competent authority,
— in all semen collection centres.
2. Whenever blood sampling for serological tests is
carried out in holdings located in the surveillance
zone, the number of blood samples to be taken in
these holdings must be in accordance with Section F
(2), first sentence. (2. The minimum number of blood
samples to be taken must allow for the detection of
10% seroprevalence with 95% confidence in pigs in
each subunit in the holding.)
However, the derogation provided for in Article 10(5)
and Article 11(4) of Directive 2002/60/EC may only
be granted if the competent authority ensures that in
each holding in the zone blood samples for
serological tests are taken. The minimum number of
blood samples to be taken must allow for the
detection of 5% seroprevalence with 95% confidence
in each subunit in the holding.
Derogations to allow animal movements
9th To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on clinical and/or
laboratory examinations of the animals of an
establishment in a protection zone, in order to
grant a derogation from prohibitions in the
movement of animals, and allow for the
Council Directive 2002/60/EC
Article 10
1.(f) Pigs may not be removed from the holding in
which they are kept for at least 40 days after the
completion of the preliminary cleansing and
disinfection, and, if necessary, disinsectisation of the
Council Directive 2002/60/EC
Article 10
3. The competent authority may authorise the removal
of pigs from the holding concerned, on condition that:
(e) if the pigs are to be slaughtered or killed, a
sufficient number of samples is then taken from the
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animals to be moved to a slaughterhouse
located within the protection zone or in the
surveillance zone or outside the restricted
zone (Art29)
infected holdings. After 40 days, the competent
authority may authorise the removal of pigs from the
said holding to be directly transported to:
• a slaughterhouse designated by the competent
authority, preferably within the protection or
surveillance zone for the purpose of immediate
slaughter,
• a processing plant or a suitable place where the
pigs are immediately killed and their carcases are
processed under official supervision,
• in exceptional circumstances, to other premises
located within the protection zone. Member States
making use of this provision shall immediately
inform the Commission thereof in the Standing
Veterinary Committee;
3. The competent authority may authorise the
removal of pigs from the holding concerned, on
condition that:
(a) an official veterinarian has carried out a clinical
examination of the pigs in the holding and in
particular of those to be moved, including the taking
of the body temperature in accordance with the
procedures laid down in the diagnostic manual and a
check of the register and the pig identification marks
referred to in Articles 4 and 5 of Directive 92/102/
EEC;
Chapter IV D
D. CHECKING AND SAMPLING PROCEDURES BEFORE
AUTHORISATION IS GIVEN TO MOVE PIGS FROM
HOLDINGS
LOCATED IN PROTECTION OR SURVEILLANCE ZONES
AND IN CASE THESE PIGS ARE SLAUGHTERED OR
KILLED (ARTICLES 10 AND 11 OF DIRECTIVE 2002/
60/EC)
1. Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 11(1)
(f), second subparagraph, of Directive 2002/60/EC, in
pigs in accordance with the diagnostic manual in order
that the presence of African swine fever virus in these
holdings can be confirmed or ruled out;
Chapter IV D
4. When the pigs referred to in point 3 are
slaughtered or killed, blood samples for serological
tests or blood or organ samples such as tonsil, spleen
or lymph nodes for virological tests must be taken
from pigs proceeding from each of the subunits from
which pigs have been moved. The minimum number
of samples to be taken must allow for the detection of
10% seroprevalence or virus prevalence with 95%
confidence in each subunit.
The type of samples to be taken and the test to be
used will be in accordance with the instructions of the
competent authority, which will take into account the
range of tests that can be performed, the sensitivity of
these tests and the epidemiological situation.
5. However, if clinical signs or post-mortem lesions
suggesting ASF are detected when the pigs are
slaughtered or killed, by way of derogation from point
4, the provisions for sampling laid down in section C
shall apply (C. SAMPLING PROCEDURES WHEN PIGS
ARE KILLED AS A PREVENTIVE MEASURE ON A
SUSPECTED HOLDING).
6. The derogation provided for in Article 10(5) and
Article 11(4) of Directive 2002/60/EC may be granted
if the competent authorities ensure that an intensive
sampling and testing scheme is also applied on the
groups of pigs to be checked or sampled referred to in
points 2, 3 and 4. In the context of this scheme, the
minimum number of blood samples to be taken must
allow for the detection of 5% seroprevalence with
95% confidence in the group of pigs in question.
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order that authorisation may be given to move pigs
from holdings located in protection or surveillance
zones in accordance with Article 10(3) of the said
Directive, the clinical examination to be carried by an
official veterinarian must:
— be carried out within the 24-h period before
moving the pigs,
— be in accordance with the provisions laid down in
A(2).
3. In case of pigs to be moved to a slaughterhouse,
to a processing plant or to other places to be then
killed or slaughtered, in addition to the investigations
to be carried out in accordance with point 1, a clinical
examination of pigs must be carried out in each
subunit in which the pigs to be moved are kept. In
case of pigs older than three to four months, this
examination must include taking the temperature of a
proportion of pigs.The minimum number of the pigs
to be checked must allow for the detection of fever if
it occurs at a prevalence of 20% with 95%
confidence in the subunits in question.
12th To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on clinical and/or
laboratory examinations of the animals of an
establishment in a protection zone, in order to
grant derogation from prohibitions in the
movement of these animals to a plant
approved for processing or disposal of animal
by-products in which the kept animals are
immediately killed (Art37)
Council Directive 2002/60/EC
Same as previous scenario
Article 10
1.(f) Pigs may not be removed from the holding in
which they are kept for at least 40 days after the
completion of the preliminary cleansing and
disinfection, and, if necessary, disinsectisation of the
infected holdings. After 40 days, the competent
authority may authorise the removal of pigs from the
said holding to be directly transported to:
• a slaughterhouse designated by the competent
authority, preferably within the protection or
Same as previous scenario
Council Directive 2002/60/EC
Article 10
3. The competent authority may authorise the removal
of pigs from the holding concerned, on condition that:
(e) if the pigs are to be slaughtered or killed, a
sufficient number of samples is then taken from the
pigs in accordance with the diagnostic manual in order
that the presence of African swine fever virus in these
holdings can be confirmed or ruled out;
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surveillance zone for the purpose of immediate
slaughter,
• a processing plant or a suitable place where the
pigs are immediately killed and their carcases are
processed under official supervision,
• in exceptional circumstances, to other premises
located within the protection zone. Member States
making use of this provision shall immediately
inform the Commission thereof in the Standing
Veterinary Committee;
3. The competent authority may authorise the
removal of pigs from the holding concerned, on
condition that:
(a) an official veterinarian has carried out a clinical
examination of the pigs in the holding and in
particular of those to be moved, including the taking
of the body temperature in accordance with the
procedures laid down in the diagnostic manual and a
check of the register and the pig identification marks
referred to in Articles 4 and 5 of Directive 92/102/
EEC;
13th To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on clinical and/or
laboratory examinations of the animals of
listed species in order to grant derogation
from prohibitions and allow for these animals
to be moved : a) from an establishment in a
surveillance zone to a slaughterhouse located
within or outside the restricted zone, b)from
an establishment outside the surveillance
zone to a slaughterhouse situated in the
surveillance zone
Chapter IV D.
3. In case of pigs to be moved to a slaughterhouse, to
a processing plant or to other places to be then killed
or slaughtered, a clinical examination of pigs must be
carried out in each subunit in which the pigs to be
moved are kept. In case of pigs older than three to
four months, this examination must include taking the
temperature of a proportion of pigs. The minimum
number of the pigs to be checked must allow for the
detection of fever if it occurs at a prevalence of 20%
with 95% confidence in the subunits in question.
Blood samples for serological tests
Chapter IV A.
4. Samples of the organs or tissues from pigs that
have been subjected to post-mortem examination
must be collected for virological tests
Chapter IV D.
4. When the pigs referred to in previous are
slaughtered or killed, blood samples for serological
tests or blood or organ samples such as tonsil, spleen
or lymph nodes for virological tests must be taken
from pigs proceeding from each of the subunits from
which pigs have been moved. The minimum number
of samples to be taken must allow for the detection of
10% seroprevalence or virus prevalence with 95%
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confidence in each subunit.
The type of samples to be taken and the test to be
used will be in accordance with the instructions of the
competent authority, which will take into account the
range of tests that can be performed, the sensitivity of
these tests and the epidemiological situation.
15th To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on clinical and/or
laboratory examinations of kept ungulates of
listed species in order to grant derogation and
allow to be moved from an establishment in
the surveillance zone to an establishment
belonging to the same supply chain, located
in or outside the surveillance zone, in order to




1.(f) Pigs may not be removed from the holding in
which they are kept for at least 30 days after the
completion of the preliminary cleansing, disinfection
and, if necessary, disinsectisation of the infected
holdings. After 30 days, subject to the conditions set
out in Article 10(3), the competent authority may
authorise the removal of the pigs from the said holding
to be directly transported to:
• a slaughterhouse designated by the competent
authority, preferably within the protection or
surveillance zone, for the purpose of immediate
slaughter,
• a processing plant or a suitable place where the
pigs are immediately killed and their carcases are
processed under official supervision, or
• in exceptional circumstances, other premises
located within the protection or surveillance zone.
Member States making use of this provision shall
immediately inform the Commission thereof in the
Standing Veterinary Committee.
Article 6
1. Where the presence of African swine fever is
confirmed in holdings which consist of two or more
separate production units and in order that the
fattening of pigs may be completed, the competent
authority may decide to derogate from the provisions
of Article 5(1)(a) as regards healthy pig production
units on a holding which is infected provided that the
No specific sampling procedures in the legislation
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official veterinarian confirms that the structure, size
and distance apart of these production units and the
operations carried out there are such that the
production units provide completely separate facilities
for housing, keeping and feeding, so that the virus
cannot spread from one production unit to another.
Article 5
2. In cases where an outbreak has been confirmed in a
laboratory, a zoo, a wild life park or a fenced area
where pigs are kept for scientific purposes or purposes
related to conservation of species or conservation of
rare breeds, the Member State concerned may decide
to derogate from paragraphs 1(a) and 1(e), provided
that basic Community interests are not adversely
affected
18th To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on clinical and/or
laboratory examinations of the animals of an
establishment located in the restricted zone of
an outbreak in order to allow their move
within the restricted zone, when restriction
measures are maintained beyond the period
set out in Annex XI
Implementing Decision 2014/178/EU
Article 3
By way of derogation from the prohibition provided for
in point (a) of Article 2, the Member States concerned
may authorise the dispatch of live pigs from a holding
located in the areas listed in Part II of the Annex to
other areas in the territory of the same Member State
provided that the pigs have been resident for a period
of at least 30 days or since birth on the holding and no
live pigs have been introduced into that holding during
a period of at least 30 days prior to the date of the
movement and
1. and a clinical examination for African swine fever
has been carried out by an official veterinarian in
accordance with the checking and sampling procedures
laid down in Part A of Chapter IV of the Annex to
Commission Decision 2003/422/EC (1) on the date of
shipment, or
2. the pigs come from a holding:
(a) that has been subjected at least twice a year, with
an interval of at least 4 months, to inspections by the
Article 3
/. . ./
1. the pigs have been subjected to laboratory testing
for African swine fever carried out with negative
results on samples taken in accordance with the
sampling procedures as laid down in the plan for the
eradication of African swine fever referred to in the
second paragraph of Article 1 of this Decision within a
period of 15 days prior to the date of the movement/
. . ./
2. the pigs come from a holding:
(a) that has been subjected at least twice a year, with
an interval of at least 4 months, to inspections by the
competent veterinary authority, which/. . ./(ii) included
a clinical examination and sampling in accordance with
the checking and sampling procedures laid down in
Part A of Chapter IV of the Annex to Decision 2003/
422/EC;
(c) in which the pigs over the age of 60 days have
been subjected to the laboratory testing for African
swine fever referred to in paragraph 1.
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competent veterinary authority, which: (i) followed the
guidelines and procedures laid down in Chapter IV of
the Annex to Decision 2003/422/EC; (ii) included a
clinical examination and sampling in accordance with
the checking and sampling procedures laid down in
Part A of Chapter IV of the Annex to Decision 2003/
422/EC.
Repopulation
19th To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on laboratory
examinations of the animals that are kept for
the repopulation prior to their introduction to
rule out the presence of the disease
No guidelines described for ruling out the presence of
disease prior to the introduction.
No guidelines described for ruling out the presence of
disease prior to the introduction.
20th To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on laboratory
examinations of the animals that have been
repopulated, in the event of unusual
mortalities or clinical signs being notified
during the repopulation; to rule out the
presence of the disease
No specific guidelines described in legislation Blood samples for serological tests
Chapter IV A.
4. Samples of the organs or tissues from pigs that
have been subjected to post-mortem examination
must be collected for virological tests
Chapter E
3. After any reintroduction of pigs, the competent
authority shall ensure that in case of any disease or
death of the pigs in the holding due to unknown
reasons, the pigs in question are immediately tested
for ASF.
21st To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on laboratory
examinations of the animals that have been
repopulated, on the last day of the monitoring
period calculated forward from the date on
which the animals were placed in the
repopulated establishment. In case the
repopulation takes place in several days, the
monitoring period will be calculated forward
from the last day in which the last animal is
introduced in the establishment
No specific guidelines described in legislation E.1. When pigs are reintroduced into a holding in
accordance with Article 13(3) (disease has not been
linked to vectors), of Directive 2002/60/EC, the
following sampling procedures must be applied:
• Blood samples must be collected at the earliest
45 days after the reintroduction of the pigs,
• In case sentinel pigs are reintroduced, blood
samples for serological tests must be taken at
random from a number of pigs that allow for the
detection of 10% seroprevalence with 95%
confidence in each subunit of the holding,
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• In case of total repopulation, blood samples for
serological tests must be taken at random from a
number of pigs that allow for the detection of
20% seroprevalence with 95% confidence in each
subunit of the holding.
2. When pigs are reintroduced into a holding in
accordance with Article 13(4) (disease has been
linked to vectors) of Directive 2002/60/EC, the
following sampling procedures must be applied:
• Blood samples must be collected at the earliest
45 days after the reintroduction of the pigs,
• In case sentinel pigs are reintroduced, blood
samples for serological tests must be taken at
random from a number of pigs that allow for the
detection of 5% seroprevalence with 95%
confidence in each subunit of the holding,
• In case of total repopulation, blood samples for
serological tests must be taken at random from a
number of pigs that allow for the detection of
10% seroprevalence with 95% confidence in each
subunit of the holding.
Then, the procedure laid down in the third indent
above must be repeated at the earliest 60 days after
total repopulation.
3. After any reintroduction of pigs, the competent
authority shall ensure that in case of any disease or
death of the pigs in the holding due to unknown
reasons, the pigs in question are immediately tested
for ASF.
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ToRs Legislation Scenario Description of the Scenario Elements of the Scenarios
ToR 2 Article 8 of the Delegated
Regulation
Article 57 of 2016/429
Regulation
Annex II of the Delegated
Regulation
1st Scenario To assess the effectiveness of the length of the
Monitoring Period, as the time period calculated
backwards from the date of the notification of the
suspicion of a category A disease in an establishment
with kept animals of listed species, for the purposes of
the epidemiological enquiry in the event of a suspicion.
• event of suspicion of a category A disease
• in an establishment with kept animals of listed
species
• time period calculated backwards from the date of
the of the notification of the suspicion
• time period before the suspicion, during which the
pathogenic agent may have been introduced in
the establishment and may have spread outside
the establishment
• the aim of the epidemiological enquire is:
a) identify the likely origin of the listed disease in
question and the means of its spread
b) calculate the likely length of time that the listed
disease has been present
c) identify establishments and epidemiological
units therein, food and feed businesses or
animal by–products establishments, or other
locations, where animals of listed species for
the suspected listed disease may have become
infected, infested or contaminated
d) obtain information on the movements of kept
animals, persons, products, vehicles, any
material or other means by which the disease
agent could have been spread during the
relevant period preceding the notification of the
suspicion or confirmation of the listed disease
e) obtain information on the likely spread of the
listed disease in the surrounding environment,
including the presence and distribution of
disease vectors
ToR 2 Article 17(2) and Article 57 of
2016/429 Regulation
Annex II of the Delegated
Regulation
2nd Scenario To assess the effectiveness of the length of the
Monitoring Period, as the time period calculated
backwards from the date of notification of the
suspicion of a category A disease in an establishment
with kept animals of listed species, for the purposes of
• event of confirmation of a category A disease
• in an establishment with kept animals of listed
species
• time period calculated backwards from the date of
the notification of the suspicion
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the epidemiological enquiry in the event of
confirmation of the disease.
• time period before the suspicion, during which the
pathogenic agent was introduced in the
establishment and during which it could have
spread outside the establishment.
The aim of the epidemiological enquire is the
same as above.
ToR 2 Article 13(b) of the Delegated
Regulation
Annex II of the Delegated
Regulation
3rd Scenario To assess the effectiveness of the length of the
Monitoring Period, as the time period calculated
backwards from the date of confirmation of a category
A disease in an establishment with kept animals of
listed species, during which the epidemiological units in
which the disease has not been confirmed were kept
completely separated and handled by different
personnel, in order to provide derogations from killing.
• event of confirmation of a category A disease
• in an affected establishment with kept animals of
listed species
• non-affected epidemiological units kept separated
• to provide derogation from killing for animals in
non-affected separated epidemiological units
• to exclude any possible contact between the
affected establishment and the separated
epidemiological units as per the epidemiological
enquiry
• time period calculated backwards from the date of
the confirmation
• time period before the confirmation, during which
the pathogenic agent may have been introduced
in the separated non-affected epidemiological
units of the affected establishment.
ToR 2 Article 27(3)c of the Delegated
Regulation
Annex II of the Delegated
Regulation
4th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of the length of the
Monitoring Period, as the time period calculated
backwards from the date of notification of the
suspicion of the latest outbreak of a category A disease
in the protection zone. Products or other materials
likely to spread the disease, must had been obtained or
produced, before this time period in order to be
exempted from prohibitions of movements.
• protection zone
• non-affected establishments
• Products or other materials likely to spread the
disease, obtained or produced, before the start of
the monitoring period of the affected
establishment that originated the protection zone
• time period calculated backwards from the date of
suspicion of the latest outbreak in the protection
zone
• time period before the notification of the
suspicion, during which the products and materials
produced in the non-affected establishments of a
protection zone may have been contaminated by
the pathogenic agent of the disease.
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ToR 2 Article 32(c) of the Delegated
Regulation
Article 48(c) of the Delegated
Regulation
Annex II of the Delegated
Regulation
5th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of the length of the
Monitoring Period, as the time period calculated
forwards from the date of semen collection from
animals of listed species kept in approved germinal
product establishments in the protection or in the
surveillance zone, to prove that the donor animal has
tested favourable on a sample taken not earlier than 7
days after the monitoring period.
• protection or surveillance zone
• non-affected approved germinal establishments
• semen from kept animals (donor) of listed species
• semen collected after the estimated date of the
earliest infection of the earliest affected
establishment that originated the protection
zone/surveillance zone (if belonging to more than
one protection or surveillance zones)
• to take samples from the donor for laboratory
analysis at least 7 days after the end of the
monitoring period
• to authorise movements of semen from approved
germinal product establishments located in the
protection or surveillance zones in case of
favourable laboratory results
• time period calculated forwards from the date of
semen collection
• time period after the semen collection, during
which the animal donor if infected could be
detected by the relevant diagnostic test.
ToR 2 Article 57(1)b of the Delegated
Regulation
Annex II of the Delegated
Regulation
6th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of the length of the
Monitoring Period, as the appropriate time period
calculated forwards from the date after the final
cleaning and disinfection and when relevant control of
insects and rodents was carried out in an affected
establishment, after which the repopulation of the
establishment may be allowed by the competent
authority.
• repopulation of a previous affected establishment
• kept animals of listed species
• to allow the repopulation of an affected
establishment
• time period calculated forwards from the date of
the final cleaning and disinfection of the
establishment
• time period to ensure that the repopulation
exercise is not put at risk due to the disease
being unknowingly present in an establishment in
the surrounding area.
ToR 2 Article 59(4)b of the Delegated
Regulation
Annex II of the Delegated
Regulation
7th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of the length of the
Monitoring Period, as the appropriate time period
calculated forwards the date when the first animal was
introduced, during which all the animals of listed
species intended for repopulation should be introduced.
• repopulation of a previous affected establishment
• kept animals of listed species to be repopulated
• the animals may not be introduced at the same
time
• time period calculated forwards from the date
when the first animal was introduced
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• time period during which animals intended for
repopulation, should be introduced and the
process of repopulation be completed.
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duration of measures in
the surveillance zone (as
referred to in Articles 55
and 56 of this Regulation)
Annex XI
Foot and mouth disease (FMD) 3 km 10 km 15 days 15 days 30 days
Infection with rinderpest virus (RP) 3 km 10 km 21 days 9 days 30 days
Infection with Rift Valley fever virus (RVFV) 20 km 50 km 30 days 15 days 45 days
Infection with lumpy skin disease virus (LSD) 20 km 50 km 28 days 17 days 45 days
Infection with Mycoplasma mycoides subsp.
mycoides SC (Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia)
(CBPP)
Establishment 3 km 45 days Not applicable 45 days
Sheep pox and goat pox (SPGP) 3 km 10 km 21 days 9 days 30 days
Infection with peste des petits ruminant virus (PPR) 3 km 10 km 21 days 9 days 30 days
Contagious caprine pleuropneumonia (CCPP) Establishment 3 km 45 days Not applicable 45 days
African horse sickness (AHS) 100 km 150 km 12 months Not applicable 12 months
Infection with Burkholderia mallei (Glanders) Establishment Establishment 6 months Not applicable Not applicable
Classical swine fever (CSF) 3 km 10 km 15 days 15 days 30 days
African swine fever (ASF) 3 km 10 km 15 days 15 days 30 days
Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) 3 km 10 km 21 day 9 days 30 days
Infection with Newcastle disease virus (NCD) 3 km 10 km 21 days 9 days 30 days
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# Nature or cause of uncertainty as described by the experts Impact of the uncertainty on the assessment
ToR 1 1 The model used to answer the ToR is based on the assumption of homogeneous
mixing, that may not hold for certain production systems
The effectiveness of the sampling strategies could be over or
underestimated.
2 Estimates for the models parameters for moderately virulence scenarios are
extracted from data come from experimental infections which may not reflect
field transmission. Furthermore, data for high virulent scenarios come from a
limited (n=9) number of outbreaks occurring in a single country (Russian
Federation)
The effectiveness of the sampling strategies could be over or
underestimated.
3 The sensitivity of virus detection is assumed to be 100% for pigs in the I
compartment; the sensitivity of serological tests is assumed to be 100% for pigs
in the R compartment.
The effectiveness of the sampling strategies could be over or
underestimated.
ToR 2 4 Data to estimate time from infection and suspicion could be only extracted from
nine references (although these came from multiple countries and were all
recent).
The effectiveness of the proposed zone size could be over or
underestimated.
5 Data on the time needed from infection until a virus or antibody response is
detectable originated from experimental challenges which may not be reflective
of field conditions
The effectiveness of the proposed zone size could be over or
underestimated.
ToR 3 6 No transmission kernels are available for ASFV. Transmission kernels for CSFV
were used as a proxy. Although transmission routes are likely to be similar for
the two viruses, CSFV is more prone to indirect transmission via fomites because
of higher levels of excretion
The effectiveness of the proposed zone size could be over or
underestimated.
7 CSF kernels were available for two epidemics (NL 1998–9 and UK 2000) and
may not be representative of transmission in other regions due to differences in
farm density, management practices, etc.
The effectiveness of the proposed zone size could be over or
underestimated.
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